As part of my Masters degree, over the past several months I have been working my way through questions intended to test my comprehension of William Shedd’s Dogmatic Theology. Shedd’s book remains one of the very best single volumes available from a conservative evangelical perspective. For those of you who are interested in theology, feel free to have a look at my ‘Shedd Report’ below. I will be adding to it in the weeks and months ahead. I have confined my answers to a one or two paragraph summary so do not look upon this report as a substitute for reading the actual book!
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY: WILLIAM SHEDD
Part 1: Theological Introduction
2. Plans, Divisions, and Subdivisions
b. Biblical, Systematic, and Polemical Theology (47-50)
(1) What is the distinction between biblical and systematic theology?
Answer: The distinction between biblical and systematic theology is found in their approach to examining the Bible. The approach of biblical theology is fractional, examining the Bible only in parts. Whilst this piecemeal approach has its uses, it is unable to provide the theologian with a comprehensive understanding of revelation. On the other hand, systematic theology acknowledges the organized nature of the Bible by examining it as a whole, rather than in parts. This comprehensive approach thus explains the individual parts so that the revelation of Scripture can be accurately interpreted “according to the proportion of faith”.
(2) Why does Shedd hold that Systematic Theology should balance and correct
Biblical Theology?
Answer: Shedd posits two substantive reasons why Systematic Theology should balance and correct Biblical Theology. First, whilst the fractional approach employed by Biblical theology allows for a detailed exegesis of distinct portions of the Bible, these portions are also vulnerable to misinterpretation when examined in isolation from the whole. By contrast, systematic theology is a scientific theology. Shedd defines science in this context as a comprehensive survey of the whole, rather then simply parts. Shedd warns that theology could not sustain its scientific attribute if the theologian were confined to only the fragmentary, incomplete view provided by Biblical theology. Second, Shedd argues that Biblical theology’s fragmentary approach makes it vulnerable to the introduction of individual opinions, whose subjectivity makes them untrustworthy. Whilst it is relatively easy to compromise portions of the Bible this way, it is considerably more difficult to inject subjectivity at a systematic level. Thus, Systematic theology protects dogmatic theology from the limitations of Biblical theology.
3. Nature and Definition of Theological Science
a. Definition of Theology? (51-53)
(1) What is the relationship between theology and ethics?
Answer: Theology and ethics are both sciences but they must not be equated in either scope or quality. Ethics is strictly legal, limited to the science of morals and duties. Theology includes all of ethics’ exploration of those morals and duties owed between God and man but its scope is far vaster. Theology is the most necessary science for it treats God as the object and theme of investigation. All things infinite and finite are included within the parameters of theology. Ethics may therefore accurately be viewed as a component part of the science of God.
b. Whether Theology is a Science (53-57)
(1) How does Shedd define the word “science”?
Answer: Shedd draws upon the words of Aquinas to define science as profound and self-consistent knowledge acquired about the “qualities and relations of an object”. Such depth and logical coherence are necessary characteristics in order for any knowledge to qualify as scientific knowledge. Science tends to offer exhaustive explanations of a subject if pursued long enough, subject to the limitations of the human mind. Shedd states that scientific knowledge may properly be pursued even in those sciences, such as theology in particular, where complete comprehension is not possible. Indeed, there may be science without omniscience.
c. Theology as an Absolute Science (57-69)
(1) How is theology an absolute science in contradistinction to relative sciences?
Answer: Theology is the science of God. The substance and properties of God are a priori. In other words, they are intrinsically necessary and immutable. Moral truths form part of the substance and properties of God. Shedd argues that all rational human beings have common principles of intelligence respecting moral truth and that it is critical to man’s immortality that such truths are accurate. Therefore, cognitive knowledge of God and morals must be true absolutely. By contrast, matter has nothing a priori or intrinsically necessary in its substance and properties. Therefore, scientific knowledge about any physical and material subject matter must be marked by contingency and relativity.
d. Theology as a Positive Science (69-75)
(1) What is meant by the term “positive science”?
Answer: The term, “positive science” means real and true knowledge about the qualities and relations of an object. Positive knowledge about the object does not require exhaustive cognition of those qualities and relations. Knowledge can be positive even whilst certain aspects remain a mystery. Further, he rejects the argument that what is known should be dismissed as mere negations, when what is known conforms to the real nature of the object. There is little value in negating statements prior to an object or idea being carefully defined by an affirmation. The negative method may then be used appropriately to remove defective information from the affirmation.
(2) Why does Shedd reject the idea that theology is primarily a science of
negations?
Answer: Shed rejects the idea that theology is primarily a science of negations because it is a skeptical position. If a theologian is restricted to making only negative statements about God, and is denied to opportunity to focus his mind on any positive conception of God, then God becomes unknown and unknowable. This, says Shed, uproots religion and paves the way to atheism in theory and practice.
C: Part 3: Theology (The Doctrine of God)
1. Nature and Definition of God
a. God’s Spirituality (153-157)
(1) How is God’s spirituality different from His creatures?
Answer: God is absolute and unconditioned spirit itself, rather than merely ‘a’ spirit. His spirituality is of an essence that transcends that of human or angel. His immortality transcends all other spirituality for it is eternity. Human spirit is finite in that it is embodied and limited by the body. By contrast, the infinite spirit is formless and un-embodied. Shedd argues however, that such characteristics make the infinite spirit more real than any other substance. Though the human spirit possesses body, this does not increase its reality relative to the transcendent spirit, which can exist without the body. The characteristics and reality of the body are derived from the informing spirit. Therefore mere body is incapable of adding anything to the reality of an essence. Spirit is more real than the corporeal and the transcendent, infinite spirit is more real than any finite spirit. The transcendence of God’s spiritual nature is such that He alone might be said to possess spirituality, just as the reality of this spirit makes all others seem unreal by comparison. Such transcendent reality denotes the quality of ontological necessity also. A necessary being, has by its nature a greater reality than any contingent being. The reality of God therefore must transcend all of His material or immaterial creatures.
(2) Why is it necessary for there to be some resemblance between an infinite Spirit and a
finite spirit?
Answer: Shedd’s main argument is that some resemblance between an infinite Spirit and a finite spirit is necessary in order to maintain a connection between them. If God is conceptually non-analogous to human experience, then religion becomes impossible as God would be completely outside the sphere of human apprehension. Knowledge of His attributes and characteristics would be inaccessible to the finite spirit. Such an absent and/or unknowable God represents the Deist and Agnostic views of God, incapable of being apprehended or worshipped by the finite spirit. Thus, the infinite and the finite must be like in kind, even if vastly separated in quality. In other words, He must at least be conceivable to human experience, even if His transcendence makes him incomprehensible.
b. God’s Substantiality (157-169)
(1) Why is the idea that God is a substance or essence an important truth to explain or
defend?
Answer: It is important to explain or defend the truth of the idea that God as a substance or essence for a number of reasons. The first reason is that anything without substance is a non-entity. An idea or mere products of the mind are examples of non-entities. Certain forms of pantheism define God as an “Absolute Idea”. This cannot be accurate for it would make God a non-entity. God is a real, actual being. He is therefore a substance. Substances possess properties. Properties are the nature of a substance and these are as real as the substance itself.
Secondly, God must be distinguished from mere order or power itself. Plato defined a substance as an entity that possesses the power to affect some other existing thing. This is different from stating something is mere order or power. God is a substance that possesses both power and properties.
Thirdly, though God is pure spirit and does not have a body, he nonetheless is a substance which makes him the foundation of natural and moral attributes. He must not be reduced to a mere influence or energy permeating the universe.
(2) What does Shedd mean when he states that God is “a most pure spirit without
passions”?
Answer: Shedd means for the word “passions” to be understood as derived from patior (to suffer). He asserts that Passion implies passivity, meaning something that is affected by something else. God is therefore a most pure spirit that cannot be affected by the forces of nature or correlated to anything other than Himself. He is self determined, with no organic unity between Himself and the universe. He therefore cannot be emotional from without by the universe. His passions are perfectly synchronized within Himself. The phrase should not be understood to mean that God is devoid of feeling and simply a blind force. God does have emotional capacity so that, for instance he can feel displeasure towards sin. He is the perfection of loving that which is good and hating that which is bad.
(3) How does Shedd explain the doctrine that God has “feelings”?
Answer: Shedd explains that Scripture attributes a full gamut of emotional feelings to God. However, some of these emotions are negative. They are incompatible with the notion of a perfect being. Such emotions must therefore be viewed metaphorically. The criterion of “divine blessedness” determines which emotions are literal and which must be metaphorical. Unhappy emotions cannot make God their subject. This criterion therefore prescribes only two fundamental emotions to God: love (agape) and wrath (orge), one awakened by righteousness and the other by sin. God must necessarily love righteousness and hate sin by his own perfect, self-moved nature. Human beings can know God’s displeasure at sin and love at righteous behaviour by following the analog provided by their conscience. God’s feelings however, are not directed at the substance of his moral agent creations. Instead his wrath is directed only against the agency of sin just as his love is directed only at righteous activity.
c. God’s Personality (169 – 178)
(1) What are the necessary elements of self consciousness?
Answer: God possesses personality which is characterized by self consciousness and self determination. Shedd defines all consciousness as a duality between subject and object. With mere consciousness, the subject and object are of different substances. With self consciousness, however, the object is the same substance as the subject. He argues that self-consciousness is the “ability possessed by a rational spirit to make itself its own object and to know that it has done so.” In the act of self consciousness, the mind looks to itself alone and no use is made, in the act to the external world or to anything outside the ego. Human beings have both consciousness (when awake) and self consciousness whereas animals have mere consciousness, or sentience. Human beings have sentience and bare thoughts but it is only through conviction of the Holy Spirit converting man to acknowledge that he is the author of his sin that man’s consciousness is elevated to self-consciousness.
(2) How do the elements of self-consciousness relate to the doctrine of the Trinity?
Answer: An analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity reveals that the elements of self-consciousness involve three distinctions, whereas consciousness has merely two distinctions. God is the same substance (essence), though God the Father and God the Son is not the same person (form). This dualism between the two is not the whole picture however. There is also the perception itself that the Father and the Son are not the same person, though of the same essence. The percipient responsible for this is the Holy Spirit, who, like the Father and the Son, is of a different form from the other two but is of the same essence. He is the third mode of divine essence, recognizing the Father and Son’s distinctive forms and unity of essence. The trinal self consciousness of the finite spirit may be understood then in light of the Trinity. Shedd argues that when one is conscious of himself, there is a subject (a mind which is contemplating itself), an object (the mind which is contemplated) and a third subject which is the form of mind that perceives the other two minds as distinct forms of the same mind.
2. Innate Idea and Knowledge of God
a. Evidence from Scripture for an Innate Knowledge of God (185-88)
(1) What is innate knowledge and why is it important?
Answer: Innate knowledge is a rational intuition of the mind, wholly based upon reason. It is knowledge that is naturally universal to the human mind although its level of development within the consciousness of man will vary. Ideas of mathematics, space and time are innate, as are, in the words of St. Paul, the invisible attributes of God. It is knowledge that cannot be cognized purely by the five senses apprehending the natural world, but is nonetheless essential in order to make rational sense of the natural world. St. Paul stresses that our perception of God is internal, systemic to the human intellect and not the result of external impressions by the senses. Innate knowledge is important because it makes possible the subjective impression of God’s creation upon the mind of man. Further because of its universality no man, be he Christian or pagan, may rid himself of the sovereignty of God nor disclaim responsibility for his sinful acts.
e. Inadequacy of Natural Religion (197-199)
(1) Why is natural religion inadequate to meet the needs of fallen man?
Answer: Natural religion is inadequate to meet the needs of fallen man because its conception of God inspires only fear and does not include hope and trust. Deists rely on reason alone to discover the attributes of God. They claim that revealed religion is superfluous and unknowable. Thus, they can conceive of a God who is perfectly just, but without revelation, they have no doctrine of redemption for the sins of man. Natural religion can manifest a perfectly just God but it has nothing to say about the quality or exercise of His mercy. Shedd concludes therefore that the deist must prove man is without need of God’s mercy before he can assert that revealed religious is superfluous and that natural religion is adequate for man.
(2) How is mercy distinguished from justice in Shedd’s discussion of natural religion?
Answer: Shedd distinguishes mercy from justice in his discussion of natural religion by distinguishing between the existence of an attribute and its exercise. Justice is an attribute of God that must necessarily exist and by his nature He must necessarily manifest at all times. It is not optional for God to be just at some times and not at others and yet remain a perfectly just God. On the other hand, some attributes of God are part of his nature but are also only manifested by an exercise of his will. God’s omniscience, for example, is an attribute that is manifested this way, as is His mercy. The key point is that the exercise of God’s mercy, is optional for God. He can decide against exercising mercy on a given occasion and still be a perfectly merciful God. Indeed, that is an essential quality of mercy – in order for it to exist, it must be something that can be with-held. Natural religion is inadequate to humanity’s needs because it can conceive only of a punishing God. Special revelation from God contains His covenantal relationship with mankind required in order to make the application of His mercy possible to those that believe and obey Him.
3. Arguments for the Divine Existence
b. Ontological Argument: Statement of the Position (201-203)
(1) How does the ontological argument support the existence of God?
Answer: The ontological argument supports the existence of God in two ways. First the argument supports the notion that necessity of existence is an attribute of being and a perfection of it. Second, it shows that necessity of existence is an attribute and perfection that belongs only to absolute and perfect being, not to relative and finite being. In other words, it is more perfect to necessarily exist than to merely possibly existence and therefore only a perfect being can have necessity of existence. Thus, when the human mind possesses the innate knowledge of a perfect being, that being must also have existence because necessary existence is surely superior to mere contingent existence. No finite being that has contingent existence can be perfect because it is possible for this being to not exist. Necessary existence therefore, is an attribute of a perfect being.
d. Cosmological Argument (212-214)
(1) How does the cosmological argument support the existence of God?
Answer: The cosmological argument supports the existence of God from the fact of the existence of the contingent universe and everything contained within it. The argument runs upon the axiom that an effect presupposes a cause. There is motion in the universe and all motion is caused by something else. Everything in the universe, including the universe itself, is contingent as opposed to necessary for it has been caused by something else. The universe however, cannot be the product of an infinite regress of contingent cause and effects. It implies therefore the necessary existence of an uncaused Prime Mover that stands outside the temporal universe of cause and effect.
e. Teleological Argument (214-216)
(1) How does the teleological argument support the existence of God?
Answer: The teleological argument supports the existence of God by pointing to the apparent marks of design and adaptation that we see in the world around us. Such marks of design in the finite world imply the existence of an infinitely intelligent designer. Design is not confined merely to the material world but in the apparent make-up of the human soul. Our will is structured for volition, our imagination for picturing and our minds for perceiving. Each aspect of our finite minds has a specific purpose. This indicates the existence of an infinite mind that is capable of creating them.
f. Moral Argument (216)
(1) How does the moral argument support the existence of God?
Answer: Shedd posits two modes of this argument supporting the existence of God. First, he points to our conscience. The fact we have a conscience indicates the existence of a moral law and consequently a law-giver, who is God. Our conscience tells us whether we are acting in obedience with such law. Second, in the natural world we are able to observe a dichotomy between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’. The bad seem to go unpunished and the good seem to go unrewarded. Our sense that such inequality exists implies that such inequalities will be put right in the hereafter by a righteous arbiter and judge.
g. Historical Argument (216)
(1) How does the historical argument support the existence of God?
Answer: The historical argument supports the existence of God by drawing an inference from the fact that all nations throughout history have maintained a belief in a Supreme Being.
4. Divine Attributes
a. Methods of Classification (274-276)
(1) What is the difference between a divine attribute and a divine Person?
Answer: Shedd argues that the difference between a divine attribute and a divine Person is that the person is a mode of the existence of the essence, whereas the attribute is a mode either of the relation or the external operation of the essence. Divine attributes are, in fact, individual conceptions of God. God is not simply an essence made up of a bunch of attributes. All of God’s essence resides in each attribute and all of the attributes reside in the essence. There are two classes of attributes: one class of attribute is passively related to itself insofar as it is simple and self related, such as ‘eternity’; the other class of attribute denotes an active operation of the essence such as ‘omniscience’. Each attribute of the latter class is a conception of the essence, whole and complete, in a particular mode of external operation. All divine attributes are objective and real.
b. Self Existence (Aseity) (276)
(1) What is the Divine Attribute of Aseity and why is it important?
Answer: Aseity is derived from the Latin ‘aseitas’ meaning ‘through himself’ and denotes the self existence of God. The ground of his being lies in Himself. This means that God is uncaused. It is important that we do not confuse aseity as meaning ‘self-caused’. God is not the necessary, eternal and non-contingent being, to whom the category of cause and effect, therefore cannot apply.
c. Simplicity (276-277)
(1) What is Divine Simplicity and why is it important?
Answer: God is “a most pure spirit, without parts” meaning that his being is un-embodied and indivisible. Man and angels cannot achieve Divine Simplicity. Man is a combination of mind and body. After death in his resurrected form, man’s body is spiritual like that of the angel. God’s Divine Simplicity is such that he is unencumbered by any form of body. It is important to note that Divine Simplicity is not contradicted by the Trinity because he remains of one essence, subsisting in three modes, in the same way that God’s attributes do also.
d. Infinity (277)
(1) What is infinity and why is it important?
Answer: The infinity of God is to refer to His divine essence as having no bounds or limits. By definition, limitation implies imperfection. Since God has no limits he must therefore be perfection in all ways in which he is infinite. Shedd argues that finite limitations refer to quantity and not necessarily to quantity since finite holiness for example, is still real holiness but just in a finite amount. God is infinite in all his characteristics, his being and attributes.
e. Immensity and Omnipresence (277-279)
(1) What are the concepts of immensity and omnipresence and why are they important?
Answer: The immensity of God refers to his relation to space and the fact that it is immeasurable. Nothing in the universe can contain God. God’s immensity is not a substance that can be observed or measured. Instead it is spiritual. His immensity means therefore that he must also be omnipresent. To be omnipresent means that he fills all the space in the universe, whilst his immensity refers to what lies beyond the universe. His immensity is therefore ‘larger’ than his omnipresence in the sense that that universe cannot contain his immensity. They are important concepts because one can then understand what it means for God to be in all places at the same time. He is not divided up into different points around the universe, heaven or hell. He is at all points, all the time. Man finds his analogy in his finite soul which found in all parts of his finite body rather than in one specific location.
f. Eternity (279-284)
(1) How does Shedd explain the relationship of divine eternity and time?
Answer: Shedd explains divine eternity is his essence as related to duration, but in order to understand divine eternity, one must negate the notion of time itself from God. God is timeless. It is not enough to say that He has no beginning or end because that still confines God within time. It is a mistake to think of eternity as quantity of time at all. Instead, divine eternity must be understood as a quality of God’s existence, rather than a quantitative measure of movement. He experiences no before or after in the linear sense. Instead His eternity is complete within Himself, unchanging and immutable.
(2) How is divine eternity related to omniscience?
Answer: God’s omniscience means that He does not experience a succession of thoughts, because succession implies points of time and God is timeless. It is inaccurate also to say that he can see into the whole future or remember the whole past. Instead, God’s omniscience is a simultaneous experience of instantaneous, complete and unchanging knowledge of all.
(3) How is divine eternity related to omnipotence?
Answer: Like God’s omniscience, God’s omnipotence experiences no succession of acts. His act of creation is a singular act of power by eternal all-comprehending decree, rendering him the eternal all-creating cause. Existing within time, man experiences a temporal succession of events but God eternally experiences only a singular act of creation.
g. Immutability (284-285)
(1) How can God “repent” if God is immutable?
Answer: God’s immutability means that he eternally unchanging in his essence, attributes, purposes and consciousness. God cannot improve upon Himself, nor affect any change in Himself. Thus, it seems contradictory to say that God could “repent” as it would appear to denote a change of mind. However, it is not God who wills a change within Himself. Rather it is that he wills a change in man, a being external to Himself. He does not change His own character or attributes. Thus when Scripture speaks of God’s repentance, it is referring to God changing the manner in which he treats man. Man, consequently increases his own knowledge and experience of the immutable character of God.
h. Omniscience (286-288)
(1) How is the knowledge of God distinct from the wisdom of God?
Answer: Divine Knowledge is a communicable attribute of God which man may experience in limited form given that he is created in God’s own image. It is intuitive, simultaneously, complete and certain knowledge. His omniscience excludes, therefore, any notion of foreknowledge and subsequent knowledge. All knowledge is present to God. God knows all possible outcomes as well as actual ones. This is referred to as God’s middle knowledge. Wisdom is a distinct aspect of the knowledge of God. Shedd explains that it is the intelligence of God as manifested in the adaption of means to ends. The end is the glory of God. Man’s pursuit of holiness is the highest end he can pursue as a finite being, but God’s end is something infinitely more glorious.
i. Omnipotence (288-290)
(1) How is divine omnipotence limited?
Answer: Divine power is omnipotence. God may choose to exercise His power. He had the option not to use his power to create the universe. He is bound only in his exercise of power post creation, by the promises made to man in Scripture. The only real limit on divine power is that God cannot do what is absurd or logically impossible.
(2) How would one respond to the charge that the concept of limited omnipotence is a self contradictory idea?
Answer: One would respond first by explaining what a logical impossibility is. As Shedd explains, a logical impossibility occurs where the predicate is contradictory to the subject ex. a round square. A round square is an absurdity because it is something that can be and not be at the same time. It is, in fact a non-entity and it cannot be a limitation on divine power to say God cannot create them. Power is the ability to create an entity. Therefore, it is no criticism of God’s power to say that he cannot create a logical impossibility because is a fundamentally absurd non-entity.
j. Holiness (including Justice) (290-304)
(1) Why does the concept of retributive justice hold a prominent place in Christian
theology?
Answer: The concept of retributive justice holds a prominent place in Christian theology because of the sinful nature of man. God’s Justice is an attribute whereby he gives to everyone what is due to him. It therefore, necessarily involves the notion of an obligation or debt. Everyone, in other words, must get what they deserve. One will receive God’s remunerative justice for obedience and his retributive justice for disobedience. In a sinless world, there would only be obedience. However, the world is sinful and thus demands the infliction of penalties for disobedience. God’s retributive justice therefore occupies a prominent place in Christian theology.
(2) Why is retributive justice necessary if there is a transgression of the moral law?
Answer: God’s mind and intentions in relation to his creation is expressed in his moral law. He commands us to follow his moral law. There would be no imperative force behind his commands to follow his law if there were no penalties for disobedience. Thus retributive justice is as necessary as the actual law itself. Remunerative justice, on the other hand remains optional for God to be exercised at his discretion. Reward for obedience is not necessary to lend imperative force to the moral law. There is nothing inherently necessary about remunerative justice in its relation to the moral law.
(3) How does one’s concept of divine omnipotence relate to the question of the absolute
or relative necessity of retributive justice?
Answer: Differing views on the question of the absolute or relative necessity of divine retribution treat the concept of divine omnipotence. Those that favour only relative necessity argue absolute necessity places a wrongful limit on God’s omnipotence. Instead, retributive justice is not a quality of God but simply an act of his will. There is no transgression of the moral law that must necessarily attract his retributive justice. On this view, the atoning sacrifice of Christ to satisfy God’s justice was not a necessary action, but merely an act of God’s will. Shedd argues that this view is incorrect for it takes a wrong view of omnipotence, by placing it above all other necessary attributes. But, he says, omnipotence cannot act in isolation from his other attributes. Those who favour only relative necessity of retributive justice end up treating God as merely a blind force.
k. Goodness (Including Benevolence and Mercy) (304-308)
(1) How is the benevolence of God proportioned and limited?
Answer: God’s benevolence is the affection God feels to the sentient and conscious creature. Though he is interested in all he has made, this particularly variety of goodness does not extend to those insentient things which have merely taken its origin from him. God’s benevolence extends to animals. Animals can receive only physical good because they lack the capacity to receive the full benevolence. Man possesses a mind as well as a body and thus, may receive the mental good as well. However, God’s benevolence towards man is limited in proportion to man’s sin. God’s benevolence is infinite and not limited by anything in itself. However, the capacity of man to receive his benevolence will vary according to his level of sinfulness.
l. Truth (308)
(1) What is “Truth” as a divine attribute?
Answer: Truth is quite simply the attribute of his nature by which God does what he has said he will do as revealed in Scripture.
A. Part 3: Theology (The Doctrine of God)
1. Trinity in Unity
b. Divine Unity and Trinality: An Overview (219-224)
(1) Summarize Shedd’s discussion in this section.
Answer: The doctrine of the Trinity is not one that may be discovered through pure reason alone, but is nonetheless capable of a rational defence. There has been much speculative disagreement over the centuries as to the metaphysical nature of the Trinity but the essential contention which grounds the doctrine is that the personality of God must be trinal in his constitution. In other words, the infinite essence is comprised of a subject that must know itself as an object and also perceive that it does. This divine trinality is of a peculiar nature, in that it is a trinality that constitutes only one being or essence. Thus, says Shedd, we must discuss unity in trinality, and trinality in unity. There is no fourth essence outside of these three persons, no one unity plus thee persons. God is one essence in three, simultaneously three persons, as opposed to a composition of three persons. Though infinite and trinal, the divine essence is designated simple because it cannot add or lose anything of its nature nor is it separable from itself. As a result of this simplicity, the finite homogenous spirit of man is able to imperfectly resemble the infinite.
c. Scriptural Evidence for the Doctrine of the Trinity (224-229)
(1) Which Old Testament passage best describes the doctrine of the Trinity.
Why?
Answer: Many passages in the Old Testament speak of the doctrine of the Trinity. Some imply it by God speaking in the plural number. Others expressly distinguish God as subject and object. Augustine himself find the Trinity in Gen 1:1-2. However, the passages of most importance to this issue are those that speak of three persons in the Supreme Being. “The Lord God and his Spirit have sent me [the Messiah]” (Isa.48:16). In Hag 2:4-5,7 three persons are mentioned: “The Lord of hosts,” his “Spirit” and the “Desire of all nations.” Here we see the trinal person of God explicitly mentioned.
d. Proper Use of Trinitarian Terminology (229-230)
(1) Summarize Shedd’s discussion in this section.
Answer: Shedd points out that neither the technical term “Trinity” or the term, “unity” are found in Scripture. Theophilus of Antioch (died 181-188) was the first to use Trinity and thereafter it came into use by the early church fathers as coming to mean trinal. Trinal denotes one simple substance, having a threefold manifestation, distinguishable from the complexity of a triple manifestation. The Trinity is composed of three persons. Personhood denotes a mode of the essence as opposed to a mere attribute. The Trinitarian person consists of an internal relation of the divine essence to itself. It is the relation of the three modes of the same essence to each other. Crucial to avoiding a self-contradiction the doctrine of the Trinity is to understand it as God as an undivided essence existing as one in another sense than he is three and three in another sense than he is one.
e. God is One in Respect to Essence (230-233)
(1) How does the idea of the opera ad intra relate to the notion of a Divine
Person?
Answer: The idea of opera ad intra is the eternal generation and spiration. These are the eternal acts and processes that allow for a personal, trinal substance. Shedd explains that the acts and processes whereby the infinite trinal essence whereby the Father fathers the Son, and the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit, makes it self-contemplating, self-knowing and self-communing. Substance on its own is impersonal but the trinal distinctions engaged in that immanent and necessary activity affords the substance personality.
f. God is Three in Respect to Persons (233-240)
(1) Regarding the eternal distinction of the Divine Persons, explain what Shedd means
when he proffers the idea that “hypostatic character is incommunicable”
Answer: In an effort to apprehend the difficult idea of a personal subsistence, the Greek Trinitarians denominated a divine person, ‘Hypostatis’ meaning ‘substance’ or instance of a substance’ ie. as equivalent to a person in a Trinitarian context. Those three substances, according to Hooker, are not three separate substances with a common property. Instead they are thee persons that all have one substance in a particular way which gives them their personal distinction from each other. This is what is known as the hypostatic character. The divine essence as evinced in the Father has the characteristic of Generation, the Son has the characteristic of Filiation and the Holy Spirit possesses the characteristic of Procession. Thus, when Shedd says the hypostatic character is incommunicable, he means that these characteristics are individual to each person and cannot be possessed by or exchanged with the others. Our understanding of this hypostatic character is limited to the terms, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. We can have no deeper metaphysical explanation of, for example, the paternity of the Father.
(2) How is a Divine Person different from a human person?
Answer: Shedd explains that the substance of a human person is not the identical and numerical substance of another human person. In other words, humans can be composed of the same type of substance as another because they are made up of the same parts, but they are separated by a temporal generation that marks their nature as comprised of individuals. These individuals exist separately from each other. On the other hand, the substance of one Divine Person is the same identical and numerical substance and the others. The divine person exists inseparably from Himself, the same substance distinguished only by the hypostatic character, but whose nature remains undivided.
g. Characteristics of Trinitarian Persons: Internal and External (241-253)
(1) Briefly state the doctrine of “eternal generation” and how this idea relates to
the Personhood of the Son.
Answer: Shedd explains the doctrine of “eternal generation” as the eternal and changeless activity within the divine essence by which God the Father produces God the Son. This involves no division of the divine essence. It is this by this generation activity that the Personhood of is the Son is identified as an individual mode of the divine essence. Shedd posits that though the generation account might appear overly speculative, it is necessary in order to lend coherency to the notion of Father and Son.
(2) Briefly state the doctrine of “spiration” and how this relates to the Personhood
of the Holy Spirit.
Answer: The Father’s distinguishing characteristic of paternity involves his own un-begottenness, his generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit. Likewise, the Son’s distinguishing characteristic is procession, in that he proceeds from the Father and also spiration of the Spirit. Spiration is the relationship with the Father and Son by which the essence is communicated to the Holy Spirit, though the spirit is in fact, no more a spirit than the other two. The Holy Spirit is characterized by procession, in that he proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Spirit’s work within Scripture is tied to inspiration, regeneration and sanctification.
(3) How is the Trinitarian idea of the Subordination of Persons distinguished from
the Arian and Semi-Arian ideas of subordination?
Answer: The Trinitarian idea of the Subordination of Persons is distinguished from the Arian and Semi-Arian ideas of subordination by the fact that the Trinitarian idea involves a subordination of person not of essences, whilst the Arian and Semi-Arian ideas include subordination of essence as well as of person. In the Trinitarian idea, there is absolute equality among the divine persons in terms of their grade of being, nature and essence but there is subordination in respect to order and relationship (ex. sonship is subordinate to father). The Arian and Semi-Arian ideas of subordination allow this subordination of persons but err in going one step further with a subordination of essence as well. God the Son is wrongly considered to be of a lower essence than God the Father and is thus degraded and humiliated.
h. Deity of God the Father (253-257)
(1) How is the “hypostatic or Trinitarian paternity of God the Father”
distinguished from “the providential paternity of God the Trinity”?
Answer: The term ‘Father’ denotes, according to Shedd, an immanent and eternal relation of the first Trinitarian person. God is the paternal Father of the Son, eternally and without reference to anything within creation. The Trinitarian paternity of God the Father is distinguishable from the providential paternity of God the Trinity, which denotes God’s relation as Father within the Trinity to the creation. Shedds explains that only one of the divine persons is the Trinitarian Father, but in relation to creation the three persons in one essence constitute the providential paternity of God the Trinity.
i. Deity of God the Son (257-267)
(1) Of all the arguments Shedd offers, which single argument is the most
compelling or convincing argument for the Deity of the Son? Why?
Answer: Of all the arguments Shedd offers, the most convincing argument for the Deity of the Son is the application of the name God to him. The Son is consistently predicted in the Old Testament and we learn from Mark 1:2 and Luke 1:76 that Jesus Christ is the messenger and Lord foretold in Mal 3:1. The absolute proof of the deity of the Son of the God, according to Shedd, is found in John 1:1 with the phrase ‘theos en ho logos’. Christ is called theos in Rom. 9:5 and “eternal life” is consistently ascribed to him throughout the Gospel of John. He is called ‘theos’ again in Titus 2:13 when he is referred to as ‘our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ.’ It is clear from the textual examples that Jesus is referred to as the Son and on par with God, as shown in Philippians 2:6.
j. Deity of God the Holy Spirit (268-271)
(1) Of all the arguments Shedd offers, which single argument is the most
compelling or convincing argument for the Deity of the Holy Spirit? Why?
Answer: Shedd demonstrates that Holy Spirit is clearly a divine person because he possesses a divine name, attributes, works and worship. Having provided these background proofs of divinity, Shedd’s argument for Deity, evidenced by the nature of his spiration and procession proves compelling. The characteristics of this nature are identical to the Son’s generation. First, it is eternal. Second, it is a nature independent of the first and second persons. And third, eternal and internal spiration is a subsistence of the divine essence emanating out of it. It thus, the Spirit bears the same characteristics as the Father and Son and thus earns acknowledgement as the third person in the Godhead.
2. The Divine Decrees
a. Preliminary considerations (311-314)
(1) How does the divine decree relate to the attributes of God?
Answer: The divine decrees relate to the attributes of God in that they regulate the operation of his attributes. God’s decrees are defined as God’s eternal purpose, according to his own will, that he has foreordained. They are therefore God’s voluntary acts according to his free decisions. The acts of God cannot be separated from his decrees because when God acts, he acts in agree with his determination. It is important to note that the divine decrees relate only to those voluntary acts. They cannot refer to non-optional immanent activities such as the eternal generation of the Son. God’s voluntary acts occur within space and time. Therefore, says Shedd, his decrees comprehend only those events that occur in time.
(2) Is the divine decree a necessary condition of divine foreknowledge? Do you agree
with Shedd’s analysis? Why or why not?
Answer: According the Shedd, the divine decree is a necessary condition of divine foreknowledge because God cannot know something will happen until he voluntarily exerts his will to make it so. He has to decide he will act until he can know what action will be brought about. Until he has thought of and decided to do something, there is, in effect, nothing to know. I agree with this analysis as it pertains to God, for God is omnipotent and therefore, whatever God decides to do, God will do successfully. I query Shedd’s analogy with man’s foreknowledge. Shedd states that in order that a man may foreknow an act of his own will, he must decide to perform it. He uses the example of a man having the power to cause an eclipse, he could know with certain the event would occur if he decided it. There is an infinite difference however, between God and man’s decision-making and foreknowledge capabilities. God can rely on his foreknowledge because he has the power to carry out successfully any act he decides to perform. Man, however, cannot be said to have foreknowledge of an event once he makes up his mind to do it, because he has no guarantee of success. Particularly when (to use an expression) our lives rest in God’s hands.
b. Characteristics of the Divine Decree (314-318)
(1) What are the four characteristics of the Divine Decree?
Answer: The four characteristics are: (a) the divine decree is founded in wisdom; (b) the divine decree is eternal; (c) the divine decree is universal; and (d) the divine decree is immutable.
(2) How does Shedd reconcile the alleged contradiction between the divine decree and human freedom?
Answer: Shedd relies on two particulars in order to reconcile the alleged contradiction between the divine decree and human freedom. First, he notes that the divinely inspired writers obviously saw no contradiction because they make no attempt to address this issue. As they are transcribing God’s Word through divine inspiration, it is clear that God himself sees no contradiction. Jesus saw no contradiction either, in his decision to go to the cross in accordance with God’s Will. Therefore, we ought to trust the superior knowledge of God that no contradiction exists. Second, there is no contradiction if one properly keeps in mind the difference between the infinite and finite mind. God’s mind experiences no sequence of events. All events occur simultaneously, without succession and are thus all certain events. Man knows only the past in a sequence whilst the future remains unknown to him. He is thus free to choose. From God’s vantage point, there is no divine foreknowledge of human volitions, God simply knows them all at once, in one act of divine tuition.
c. Efficacious and Permissive Decrees (318-322)
(1) What is the distinction between the efficacious and permissive aspects of the
decree?
Answer: Shedd explains that efficacious decrees determine events by physical causes. The permissive decree relates only to moral evil, namely sin. Both decrees are infallibly certain but only the efficacious decree immediately acts upon the finite will. Also, sin is very limited in its scope when compared with the vastness of the material world, governed by the efficacious decrees. The permissive decrees do not interfere with human freedom to commit sin nor do they determine the outcome of sinful choices. God simply permits (as opposed to brings about) the consequences of man’s sinful choices.
(2) How does this distinction help us understand the role of sin in the decree of
God?
Answer: The distinction’s practical value is that we understand that God decrees sin. We learn of his sovereignty over the material world and whilst he is not the author of sin and forbids it. We realize that he could choose not to permit sin and thus, he has sovereignty over sin and hell, as well as over holiness and heaven. We cannot escape the reality therefore, of God’s sovereignty over all. There is however, a mystery in this that we are incapable of solving. We do not understand how the origin of sin can be certain (as by decree) when God is not the author of sin. Shedd lists the inadequate responses to this mystery and concludes that only that there must be some unknown method that does not involve his authorship.
Fate, Certainty, Compulsion and Necessity (322-324)
(1) How is the biblical concept of the decree different from the Non-Christian concept of Fate?
Answer: The heathen concept of fate is simply another word for chance. It involves merely the connection of impersonal causes and effects. To be sure, the Christian decree involves causes and effects but there is a teleological purposes underpinning all causes and effects. God, the personal decree-maker brings about a wise and purposive plan by making use of causes and effects towards a certain end, achieving this either by physical or more means. Fate brings about things the same way, by chance. On the heathen view, God himself is subject to fate, whereas the divine decree is subject to the voluntary will of God.
h. Arminian and Calvinistic Systems Compared (344-345)
(2) Summarize this section of Shedd
Answer: Calvinism and Arminianism are the two great systems of evangelical theology. They have very different views respecting the doctrines of election and preterition.
First, in Calvinism, God’s election precedes faith and preterition precedes perseverance in unbelief. In other words, God knows and determines who will be saved and who damned regardless of any human free action. By contrast, the Arminian view is that faith brings about election and preterition comes about only as a result of persevering in unbelief. Under Arminianism, we know why some are saved and some damned, it is because of their election or preterition follow their free choices, rather than precede them as under the Calvinist view.
Second, on the Arminian view, God’s election and preterition are judicial, not sovereign acts. God rewards or punishes based on what is chosen by the free agent. Calvinists say that it is God’s good pleasure alone that determines whether a man is saved or damned.
Third, on the Arminian view, man may be saved or fall away from salvation during life right up until the point of death. Therefore, his election can only be determined after death.
Finally, the Arminian view of election would lead to difficulties on the subject of man’s inability were it not for the work of the Holy Spirit. It had been said that man lacks the ability to find saving faith within himself because of his sinful nature. However, it is by the Holy Spirit that man receives sufficient grace to generate faith and carry him forward through successive stages of conversion. It is his choice to ‘meet God halfway’ and cooperate with the gift of grace available by the power of the Holy Spirit.
k. Teaching and Preaching the Doctrines of Election and Reprobation (351-352)
(1) Summarize Shedd’s advice regarding teaching the doctrines of election and reprobation.
Answer: These doctrines are higher truths, available only to those of mature faith, who have combined and understood all other truths of the Gospel. They are the schemes combine and systematize all others, embracing the doctrines of grace and redemption. It is enough for a man to know and believe in grace and redemption, but the man who is mature in his faith, may apprehend these doctrines also. They should not be taught to those who have not yet mastered the divine doctrines.
Election looks at the greater picture, the full history of mankind. Election by grace is encouraging to the sinner because he knows that he may depend upon the Holy Spirit to regenerate his failing will. If salvation were left to man’s will, then the success of God’s plan would not be certain. However, the work of the Spirit, working in men’s hearts will bring about a certain outcome, that one day mankind will be brought to repentance, belief and salvation.
3. Creation
a. Creation Ex Nihilo (366-371)
(1) Why is the phrase “ex nihilo” used to explain the biblical idea of creation?
Answer: The phrase “ex nihilo” is used to explain the biblical idea of creation because it describes God’s first act outside of Himself. There is literally nothing before the act of creation, except, Shedd notes, the eternal activity within the Triune essence. Creation ex nihilo is unique to Scripture. It is vitally important also that the phrase be invoked in the account of creation because it firmly excludes the possibility of the act of creation having taken place out of existing matter of any kind.
(2) How does the maxim “nothing comes from nothing” relate to the doctrine of creation
ex nihilo?
Answer: The maxim “nothing comes from nothing” holds true in relation to physical objects within the universe because it presupposes the existence of matter in order for something to be caused by something else. Thus, within creation, nothing comes from nothing. However, it does not hold true with reference to the creation of matter itself. God, on the other hand, is a being of infinite power, outside the universe, who is capable of originating entity from non-entity. Creation ex nihlio has three characteristics which distinguish it from the physical maxim “nothing comes from nothing”. First, creation has a beginning; second, creation is optional and not necessary for God and third, creation results in the origination of a new substance rather than the mere manipulation of existing substance.
b. Creation Account in Genesis (371-374)
(1) Summarize this section of Shedd.
Answer: Genesis begins by differentiating between God and the physical universe of matter and mind. God is immediately presented as transcendent and separate, the uncaused Creator. God and the universe are two substances, the latter of which was created ex nihilo. God is infinite and immutable whereas the universe is simply unlimited, meaning that it is capable of increase or decrease.
In relation to time in the Genesis account, Shedd asserts that there is a vast expanse of time between the creations of the angels and chaotic matter and the six days of creation, followed by God’s formation of the observable of the observable universe and the earth itself. Citing Augustine’s exegesis of Creation, Shedd notes that the patristic and medieval view of ‘day’ was not the 24 hour day that we observe. He points out also that there is nothing in Moses’ words that requires us to interpret the word, ‘day’ as specifically meaning 24 hour days either and there is in fact, much to forbid it. In fact, the word ‘day’ is best understood in the Jewish context as meaning a period of time having a beginning and an end, and that the seven day week that we know is simply a copy of the divine week on a smaller scale.
Shedd then speaks of science in a section describing the harmony of the biblical creation with physical science. It is a reassuring account of the many times in which science has been in conflict with itself and every time it has has appeared to conflict with revelation, science and revelation have found to be actually be in harmony after careful analysis. For example, heliocentric Copernican physic, one thought to be heretical, is in fact, perfectly in keeping with biblical physics. The study of geology especially, has shown that the Genesis account of the formation of the earth is accurate and has cleared up seeming contradictions in the Genesis accounts, such as how there could be light and plants upon the earth before the appearance of the sun. He also strongly states that Mosaic law allows for variations within a species but firmly asserts the fixed nature of species. In modern language, Shedd would argue that Mosaic law allows for microevolution but flatly denies the possibility of macroevolution.
d. Eternity of Matter vs, Creation Ex Nihilo (380-387)
(1) What is the single strongest (i.e., most persuasive) argument against the
eternality of matter? Why?
Answer: The single strongest argument against the eternality of matter is that there is nothing in matter to imply necessary existence. Possibly the most fundamental question that philosophy can ask with reference to the universe is “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Matter can only present itself as a contingent series of cause of effects. Logically then, if none of these causes is necessary, then there is no reason why any of it ought to have happened at all. In addition, in relation to time, it would be impossible for matter to reach its present state if it had to cross an infinite abyss in order to reach the present. There must be a definitive, necessary cause that can allow for the sequence of contingent cause of effects that we see in the universe to begin.
(2) What is the single weakest (i.e., least persuasive) argument against the
eternality of matter? Why?
Answer: The weakest argument against the eternality of matter is that it does not imply absolute perfection. This argument assumes the existence of absolute perfection ie. God. Those who argue in favour of the eternality of matter, would deny the notion of absolute perfection. They would argue that only the theist is interested in absolute perfection. One must argue against the existence of the eternality of matter by invalidating it on its own premises, rather than simply assuming the validity of one’s own position and saying then that the eternality of matter hypothesis does not measure up.
4. Providence
a. Chapter (412-415)
(1) Why does Shedd reject the notion that created things can be self
-sustaining? Do you agree with Shedd’s analysis? Why or why not?
Answer: Shedd rejects the notion that created things can be self-sustaining because he views preservation and government as two functions in the eternal providence of God, both of which suppose creation. Shedd argues therefore that anything that exists as a result of creation ex nihilo requires the sustaining power of the Creator. If the Creator were to withdraw his power, the created matter would be unable sustain itself because self-sustenance is incommunicable from the infinite to finite. I think that this is a poor bit of writing by Shedd because he fails to define his terms. What does he mean by ‘sustaining’? More fundamentally, what does he mean by power? God has created natural laws in which the world operates by natural means. If Shedd is saying that if God uncreated the universe, man could not continue to exist, there is no objection. But Shedd is not saying that. He is saying that even without a conscious act of annihilation, man could not survive. The finite self is still subject to annihilation even within God sustaining power – death is the obvious example of man’s lack of self-sustenance. God’s ‘withdrawing of power’ requires Shedd to define the word ‘power’. Otherwise, the phrase is merely poetic and devoid of much helpful meaning.
(2) What distinguishes the biblical view of providence from the deistic view and the
pantheistic view?
Answer: According to Shedd, the deistical view of providence is that God has merely imparted matter with certain properties and placed them under certain invariable laws. He then has no further involvement in man or the universe. He watches from a distance. Deism therefore implies that God does make his creation self-sustaining, able to operate within natural laws without his sustaining power.
The pantheistic view of providence is that God’s presence is the soul of the universe, immediately present and operating the universe. God is the only agent, informing life, the only substance, all life being part of his own. There are, on this view no secondary substances or second causes. God is in all things, making them move on the pantheistic view.
(3) What is “preservation” as a function of divine providence?
Answer: According to Scripture, God is a distinct and separate being both from the created universe (contra pantheism) and created man. Man is a distinct and separate being from God. Preservation is the operation of God upon man in such a way that is in accordance with the nature of man. God will act within and through the material world, using material laws to bring about his purposes (ex. causing grass to grow). He will also, and in a separate category, work upon and through the mind of man. But God respects the freedom of his creation. He will not coerce it or act counter to its nature. He accommodates himself to the nature of the creature whilst bringing about his providential purposes, respecting the creature’s individual freedom at all times.
(4) How does Shedd use the relation of the human soul and the human body to illustrate divine providence?
Answer: Shedd describes that mind, body and soul as separate entities. The mind that causes the physical body to move are separate forces. So too is the soul, which operates as every point of the body and mind. God acts in the same way. He is separate from the physical universe yet he acts within it at all points simultaneously, as the soul operates within the mind body.
(5) What is government as a function of divine providence.
Answer: As originator of creation ex nihilo, God must also have absolute control over his creation. God governs the physical universe through the administration of natural laws. God has arranged the universe a certain way, and his natural laws act in a manner compliant with that arrangement. God could have arranged the universe differently had he wished. The laws of nature are therefore not absolute, but merely relative to how God has chosen to arrange the universe.
(6) Does God govern the physical world differently from the way He governs the mental world?
Answer: God governs the mental world by administering it through the natural laws and properties of mind. Moral influences, such as circumstances and examples, are part of the physical realm. In this respect, governance is of the same type as the physical world. However, there is also the additional, governance of the Holy Spirit who will separately and directly govern the heart and will.
5. Miracles
a. Chapter (416-423)
(1) What is a miracle? Why does God perform miracles?
Answer: Miracles are natural events to God but they appear unnatural and extraordinary to humans. This is so because they involve a different exertion of divine power from what humans are accustomed to seeing in the course of their daily lives. God uses miracles on occasions where naturalistic means at a specific moment in time would be insufficient to bring about the event that God wishes to occur.
Miracles would only be unnatural to a deistic, impersonal god, who set the universe in motion by means of natural laws and has since departed. Miracles are the hallmark of an involved deity with a free personality, whose middle knowledge results in him modifying and arrange his plans according to circumstances.
(2) What is the single best argument given to refute those who reject the idea of miracles?
Answer: Shedd very correctly points out the fallaciousness of Hume’s argument. Hume argues that miracles are impossible based on the fact that they contradict uniform human experience. But Shedd shows that the uniformity of human experience is in no way a conclusive demonstration of the uniformity of natural laws. There is nothing in nature that can demonstrate the immutability of natural laws. Therefore, there is no way to ever conclusively show that a miracle is a violation of natural laws because Hume cannot prove that natural laws are absolute uniform.
A. Part 4: Anthropology
1. Man’s Creation
a. Preliminary Considerations (429-430)
(1) What distinguishes human beings from angels?
Answer: Human beings are created as male and female. Without both sexes, the idea of man is incomplete. Together, they constitute the human species and are capable of propagating. Angels, by contrast, are sexless. Though they resemble man in having souls, they are dissimilar in that there is no male and female. As such, they are not capable of marrying or propagating as a species like man is, but are created as distinct and separate individuals.
(2) What distinguishes human beings from the lower animals?
Answer: The lower animals do not have souls. When God formed the body of man from the dust of the ground He breathed life into his nostrils and man became a living soul. Man is thus comprised of a material body and an immaterial soul. Body and soul, though part of the same creative work by God, are of a different nature and substance from each other. By contrast, Shedd writes that the origin of animals is associated with the material world alone. God created every living animal but only man is created in His Image with a living soul. When creating man, God addresses Himself, but when creating the lower animals he addresses only the inanimate world.
c. General Approaches to the Doctrine of Original Sin (434-438)
(1) Of all the approaches to the doctrine of original sin, which one is the best approach? Why?
Answer: Shedd offers five approaches to the doctrine of original sin. The first four fall generally into the Augusto-Calvinistic anthropology, whilst the fifth is that of the ancient Semipelagian and the modern Arminian. Rejecting the fifth view because of its alignment with Arminianism (which has other doctrinal shortcomings sufficient to disqualify it here) the best approach is to accept the doctrine as a fact of revelation whose explanation is attempted by the theory of a representative or forensic union with Adam. This explanation has an attractive coherence in its reasoning that Adam’s disobedience of the law is reversely mirrored in Christ’s adherence to the law and likewise, Adam’s posterity neither deserve the imputation of his sin, but nor do they deserve the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. On this view, the posterity is not guilty of Adam’s sin because they were not there to commit it, but they suffer the penalty. Neither Adam’s sin makes them inherently guilty but neither does Christ’s work make them inherently righteous. They avoid however, the penalty for their representative Adam’s sin.
That is not to say that the fourth approach is not without some formidable defenders in the persons of Hodge and Turretin. However, Shedd points out that there are self-contradictory elements in it that would seem to make it less credible than the approach illustrated above.
d. Scriptural Support for Traducianism (438-444)
(1) What is the single strongest Scriptural argument for Traducianism? Why?
Answer: Shedd uses the Scripture well to present the Scriptural foundations for Traducianism, the view that the soul is propagated and inherited from the parents along with the body, moving from Genesis and the creation of man as a species in two individuals, through Scriptural support in the New Testament. Having presented such foundations, the strongest Scriptural argument in support of Traducianism actually comes from the use of a single word in Rom. 5:12 – hermarton, meaning ‘sinned’. It appears as an active verb throughout Scripture, at no point appearing as a passive verb. The significance of this is that if all “sinned” in Adam (in the active use of hemarton), all must have existed in him. Shedd points out that non-entity cannot sin and neither can mere physical substance. Thus, the consistent, active use of a single verb in Scriptures strongly argues in favour of Traducianism.
e. Theological Arguments for Traducianism (444-464)
(1) What is the single strongest theological argument for Traducianism? Why?
Answer: The single strongest theological argument for Traducianism relates to the transmission of a sinful inclination. The theory holds that original sin was conveyed by the first parents upon their posterity by natural generation so that all who are conceived are born into sin. Shedd explains however, that this necessitates some vehicle to transmit the sin from the subsequent generation upon its offspring; a common human nature wherein the sin is transmitted. Here we have an argument for the necessary existence of the soul. Tertullian writes, “The transmission of the sin involves the transmission of the soul”. Sin resides in the soul and is thus transmitted with it. A physical substance is incapable of transmitting a non-physical substance.
Shedd presents two arguments for such transmission by way of refuting two competing theories. First, if each soul were created ex nihilo at propagation, there would be nothing to pass down from Adam to each subsequent generation. Second, if all souls were created at the commission of Adam’s first sin, they would each have to repeat Adam’s sin and there would be as many causes of death in the world as there are souls. The transmission of the sin with the transmission of the soul is thus the single strongest theological argument for Traducianism.
f. Physiological Arguments for Traducianism (465-472)
(1) What is the single strongest physiological argument for Traducianism? Why?
Answer: The single strongest physiological argument for Traducianism is presented by Shedd on the definitions of species. Shedd defines a species is the primitive invisible substance which God created from non-entity, as the rudimental matter of which all the individuals are composed. It is, he explains, what makes an oak tree an oak tree. All of the substance that goes into making something an oak tree is contained in the first created oak tree. From thence, it is God’s sustaining and providential power that allows the oak tree to propagate. The same argument can be applied to human beings. I find this argument helpful because it offers a distinct stance that stands in contrast to macroevolution. It may not be a correct argument, but it is logically coherent based on what we know of a Creator God and his various attributes.
2. Man’s Primitive State
- Preliminary Considerations (494-495)
(1) What is “concreated holiness”?
Answer: “Concreated holiness” is the state that man was created in. When man was created by God after His own Image in knowledge, righteousness and holiness, man was not only negatively innocent, but positively holy. In his regenerate condition therefore, man is restored to his primitive state of true holiness
(2) How does the idea of “concreated holiness” relate to Augustianism, Pelagianism, and Semi-Pelagianism?
Answer: “Concreated holiness” is one of the distinguishing tenets of Augustianism, accepted by Calvinists and early Lutherans, and rejected by Arminians and later Lutherans. Pelagianism denies that holiness is concreated, asserting rather that the will of man by creation and in its first condition is characterless. In modern vernacular, the man might be called ‘a blank slate’, whose first act is to originate holiness or sin. We are born as Adam was, characterless, without sin or holiness. This stands in marked contrast to the Augustian tenet.
Semipelagianism mostly concurs with Pelagianism on this point, with the exception that the two disagree on the issue of the transmission of a vitiated physical nature, with Pelagianism denies and Sempelagianism accepts. The rational and voluntary nature of man entails, on the Semipelagian approach, that sin and holiness are self-originated by each individual.
- Two Phases of Holiness: Knowledge and Inclination (495-496)
(1) How does knowledge relate to holiness and sin?
Answer: Man was created with knowledge of God that was conscious and spiritual. He had an immediate and practical apprehension of God and divine things. Before the Fall, man was conscious of holiness and unconscious of sin. Apostasy gave man a conscious knowledge of sin, whilst reducing his former holy knowledge of God to speculative and theoretical knowledge only.
(2) How does inclination relate to holiness and sin?
Answer: Created man’s inclination and moral disposition was to live with his will in perfect harmony with God’s law. Shedd explains that the two were so perfectly aligned that pre-Fall holy Adam would have recognized no distinction in his conscious mind. His duty to live by the law was also so inclination so that the law never felt imposed upon him but was rather “a living actuating principle”. Law and the will were one. According to Shedd, “law coupled with the threat of punishment is law in a form suited only to a will at enmity with it”. Thus, the change in relationship between God’s law and the inclination of man after sin entered the world.
- Voluntariness as Self-Determination (498-502)
(1) How does Shedd define freedom of the will?
Answer: Shedd defines freedom of the will as its self motion. “That which is self-moved is not forced to move; and that which is not forced to move is free. Simple self-motion or self-determination, therefore, is the freedom of the will.”
(2) What is the best argument Shedd offers to support the idea that self-determination or inclination is compatible with inability to do the contrary
Answer: The best argument Shedd offers to support the idea that self-determination or inclination is compatible with inability to do the contrary is to use God Himself as an example of the idea in application. The Supreme Being is self-moved, unable to sin and yet in Him is the highest form of moral freedom. Shedd rightly points out that the more intense the self-determination in any being, the more intense the freedom and thus, an infinite being will have an infinitely higher level of freedom than any finite being. And yet, at the same time, as one’s self-determination increases, the power to do the contrary will decrease as well at a proportionate rate, in accordance with the logic of non-contradiction. God’s infinite self-determination excludes the possibility of change in that self-determination and thus, His power to do the contrary. He is simultaneously both infinitely free and unable to do to what is contrary to his infinitely moral nature.
(3) How does the idea of “self-determination” relate to Augustinian and Pelagian theories of moral freedom?
Answer: According to Shedd, the Augustinian asserts that the essence of voluntariness is self-determination merely and only, whereas the Pelagian asserts that indifference with the power to will in either direction is the essence of voluntariness and that without the continual existence of this power of alternative choice, there is no freedom. The Augustinian approach says that a self-moved will is free even if it cannot act otherwise. Shedd gives the example of a man walking. A man who is walking is really and truly walking freely, even if he is unable to fly.
The Pelagian disagrees however, saying that such self-motion is insufficient. Indifference, or indetermination is the sine qua non of moral freedom for the Pelagian on the ground that there must be an inalienable power of alternative choices at all times in order to have freedom of the will. Indifference in either direction, to the Pelagian, is the only way that this freedom can remain constant. As Shedd puts it succinctly, “The Pelagian asserts that the will as un-inclined and indifferent chooses. He postulates a volition antecedent to any inclination. The Augustinian asserts that the will is never un-inclined or indifferent. There is no volition prior to inclination. The former places freedom in an act of the will prior to inclining; the latter places it in the very act itself of inclining.”
- Refutation of the Theory that Freedom Consists in Indetermination or Indifference (502-505)
(1) What is the strongest argument (i.e. most persuasive) against the idea that freedom consists in indetermination or indifference?
Answer: The strongest and most persuasive argument against the idea that freedom consists in indetermination or indifference is that the freedom of indifference is never found in actual. No example of freedom of indifference has been found. Indetermination presupposes total equilibrium and indifference from which decisions are then made. But experience teaches that consciousness never starts from indifference, but from an inclined one.
(2) What is the weakest argument (i.e. least persuasive) against the idea that freedom consists in indetermination or indifference?
Answer: The least persuasive argument against the idea that freedom consists in indetermination or indifference is that the free will would have no contents if this were the case. As the power to choose between two contrary ways implies that as yet there is no action of the will. An undetermined will however, is a contradiction in terms. This argument is logically sound but lacking in explanatory scope, thus making it the least persuasive argument.
3. Human Will
a. Definition of the Will (509-514)
(1) What is human “understanding” as a faculty of the soul? How is it affected by the Fall of man?
Answer: Human “understanding” is the cognitive faculty or mode of the soul. It comprises the intellect and the conscience. The understanding is devoid of inclination or desire. It perceives what ought to be done and what ought not to be done but is incapable of doing anything. The understanding is the fixed and stationary faculty or mode of the hole. It can be harmed but it cannot be radically changed. The will can be radically changed, but the intellect remains the same. After the Fall, man is still capable of obeying logic and has knowledge of mathematics, ethics, intuitions and knowledge of right and wrong remain. Sin darkens and stupefies the cognitive faculty but it does not overthrow it.
(2)What is the “will” as a faculty of the soul? Generally, what are the objects of the will?
Answer: The will is that faculty or mode of the soul which self-determines, inclines, desires, and chooses in reference to moral and religious objects and ends. The voluntary and moral objects of the will are centred in God and are inclined either to love or hate him. They are eternal is nature.
(3) Regarding the issue of mutability, how does the will differ from understanding?
Answer: The will differs from understanding in that it is mutable and capable of a radical and total change or revolution. With the Fall, came a radical change in the will of man. He became inclined exactly contrary to what he was by creation. The moral and religious objects of the will went directly contrary to what it was at creation. It was a radical alteration of the direction of the will so that it is now turned against God.
d. Inclination vs. Volition (518-527)
(1) What is “inclination”?
Answer: Inclination is the central act of the will. It is those actions of the will which terminate on the soul itself, such as when we love God supremely. One is not conscious of their ability to do it or not. There is no power as such of alternative choice. One is already self-determined.
(2) What is “volition” as distinct from “inclination”?
Answer: With volition, the action of the will terminates on the body, rather than the soul. One is conscious of one’s ability to do something or not and there is the power of alternative choice. The difference between volition and inclination can be seen by considering the moral desires and affections. Whereas inclination is the central action of the will, volition is the superficial action of the body. It is important to note however, that the inclination is the source of the volitions and is far more profound. No amount of resolution can change one’s inclinations. Inclinations are better termed “voluntary” or spontaneous central acts of the will, as opposed to the volitional, superficial act of choosing.
(3) How do the concepts of inclination and volition relate to the issues of sin and grace?
Answer: The first sin was the self determining inclination of the will to evil, which according to Shedd, expelled the existing self-determination to good, and not a volition in a state of indifference. Adam inclined to evil. He did not choose to incline. As children of Adam, we share that inclination.
But grace is an instance of regeneration, at which point a new inclination is begun immediately by the Holy Spirit. The fallen will is regenerated and the Holy Spirit inclines man towards God. Man does not choose to incline himself. Rather the Spirit does it for him. It is the efficient Spirit that moves man’s recipient spirit to regeneration whereas in apostasy, it was merely the inclination of man’s spirit towards evil.
(4) Man’s Probation and Apostacy
- Adam and Eve and Mutably Holy by Creation (535-537)
(1) How does the state of Adam before the Fall differ from the state of holiness of those in heaven?
Answer: The state of Adam before the Fall differs from the state of holiness of those in heaven in that Adam’s will towards holiness is mutable. Adam’s created perfection was relative rather than absolute. The Lord endowed him with sufficient holiness to resist the serpent’s temptation, but by limiting Adam’s existing self-determination he gave Adam the opportunity and ability to freely choose either to persevere in holiness or turn away from God. As a created creature, he was a probationary agent, given the ability to choose holiness or apostasy. Had he persevered, he would have secured by his own work indefectibility or immutable perfection.
Contrast Adam’s state with the believer’s perseverance and indefectibility under the convenient of grace, which is infallibly secured by the operation of the Holy Spirit. The believer’s soul in heaven enjoys infallible safety and security. It is no longer a probationary agent but has been granted absolute perfection.
- Nature of the First Sin (538-540)
(1) How was the first sin different from all other kinds of sin?
Answer: The first sin was unique in that it involved a transgression of a law confined by God to the Garden of Eden. This particular commandment has never been transgressed since the Fall. It is a non-repeatable sin.
Moreover, it was a wilful and wanton sin that cannot be accounted for on natural and rational grounds. Adam’s nature was not fallen prior to the transgression. He had no internal desires contrary to the will of God. There was no sinful nature for Satan to exploit, as is the case with man today. Instead, the proud and selfish lust for a false and forbidden knowledge had to originate with Adam himself. It was an act of voluntary self-determination in response to a purely external suggestion by Satan. The wickedness of such an act is illustrated by the ease with which the temptation ought to have been resistible. Adam chose instead to disobey – his sinful self determination was both self-caused (and thus irrational) and contrary to pure reason because there was no good reason for Adam to have decided to sin.
- Death as the Consequence of the First Sin (540-542)
(1) What is Shedd’s strongest argument that Adam was immortal before the Fall?
Answer: Shedd’s strongest argument that Adam was immortal before the Fall involves the threatening of death in Gen. 2:17 which, Shedd explains, implies that as things then were there was no liability to death. There was no sin and no death. From Gen. 3:22, Shedd infers that in the original plan provision was made for the immortality of the body and that after the transgression, that immortality had to be removed by a special act of God. Further, Shedd quotes Rev. 2:7 and Rom 8:11, 23 to show that complete resurrection involves a perfectly glorified body that is beyond the threat of death. Shedd’s thus utilizes Scripture to show Adam’s pre-Fall condition and the promise of restoration to immortality through resurrection.
- Cause of the First Sin (542-546)
(1) How does deception relate to the issue of the cause of sin.
Answer: Some theologians have tried to explain the origin of sin by understanding rather than the will. Their motive appears to be to explain away the capricious nature of Adam’s decision to commit the first transgression. Instead, some theologians have suggested that Eve was deceived by an apparent good, namely the knowledge of good and evil. It was possible to deceive Eve in her pre-Fallen state because although she was enlightened in its knowledge of God, it was not omniscient and could therefore be deceived. Shedd does not find this attempt to mitigate the blameworthiness of Eve’s rebellious self-determination to be plausible. He argues that though she was capable of knowledge and that an apparent good to know even more would have presented a reasonable object of attraction, Eve ought to have been content with the knowledge she had and resisted. Instead, both she and Adam wilfully turned from God and disobeyed. Shedd opines that it was the will that was the proximate and efficient cause of the first sin and not the understanding. We can reject apparent goods as well as real ones. There is no necessity in the apparent good of increased knowledge that can replace the will with understanding as the cause of the first sin.
5. Original Sin
b. Adam’s Sin as Twofold: Internal and External (550-557)
(1) What are the internal and external parts of the first sin? How is this distinction helpful for understanding sin?
Answer: The internal part of the first sin was the originating and starting of a wrong inclination. It began b Adam first inclining to self instead of God as the ultimate end. It is the principal part of the first sin because it involves an origination from nothing of a sinful disposition in the human will. The inclination away from God was an act of pure self-determination.
The external part of the first sin was the exertion of a wrong volition prompted by the wrong inclination. This is the secondary part of the first sin. Having developed an inclination towards self, the Adam then reached out and ate the apple in order to gratify the inclination. This distinction is useful for understanding sin because we realize that sin is a two stage process, beginning in the mind and progressing to a physical act of the body.
(2) How are the terms “voluntary” and “volitionary” distinguished with regards to the internal part of Adam’s first sin?
Answer: Volition involves choosing. A choice does not occur without an inclination towards one alternative or the other. The internal part of Adam’s first sin was voluntary, in that it was the will as desire or inclination towards something (self) and away from something else. The possibility of a volitional act of choice is dependent upon the direction of one’s inclination.
(3) What is “concupiscence”? How is concupiscence different from “natural” created appetites or desires?
Answer: Concupiscence is an ardent or lustful longing that is sinful in inclination. Eve’s desire for the fruit of the tree was not an innocent desire for true knowledge – that had already been granted her by creation and being in holy fellowship with God. Rather, she came to lust for the false knowledge that Satan had his angels had acquired by apostasy and that God had forbidden man to have. Concupiscence for such knowledge was the beginning of sin in her will.
- Imputation of Adamic Guilt (557-564)
(1) Regarding the imputation of sin, why is the concept of the indivisibility of guilt or merit important?
Answer: Both the internal and external parts of sin are imputed to Adam and his posterity because they committed the first transgression, involving both an evil desire and an evil act. Thereafter, the whole guilt for that first act is imputed to each and every one of the posterity. The guilt for Adam’s act is not divided up into tiny slices among all the persons that have walked the earth after Adam. We each bear the full burden of the Adam’s guilt along with him.
Likewise however, the merit of Christ’s obedience is indivisible on the same principle. Every man who seeks it may receive the full imputation of Christ’s merit and be restored in righteousness to the Father.
(2) Why is the concept of “union” important for understanding and justifying the doctrine of imputation?
Answer: The imputation of Adam’s sin upon his propagation involves a natural union of constitutional nature and substance. Adam and Eve were created; they were probationary agents and their fall was freely chosen. It traducianism is true, then Mankind shares a natural union of substance with the first parents. Traducianism does not apply however, to soteriology and redeption. Traducianism starts with the race – we all acquire the full imputation of guilt for the first parents’ sin. Redemption however, begins with the individual. We all fall but some are redeemed.
- Original Sin as a Corruption of Nature (564-568)
(1) Why does Shedd believe the theory of mediate imputation is illogical? Do you agree with this analysis?
Answer: Shedd notes that human nature in the first parents inclined from holiness to sin, with the consequence that human nature lost its original righteousness and became morally corrupt. From this, he takes the position we can impute guilt from their actions, provided we acknowledge that the first sin was committed and righteously imputed. If we can impute the cause, then we can certainly impute the effect; but if the first sin is not imputed, then we cannot impute the corruption of nature. In other words, we cannot impute the effect unless we impute the cause.
It is from this position that Shedd challenges the logic of mediate imputation, which holds that Adam and Eve alone, as individuals, bear the guilt for the first sin and man is only righteously imputed with the guilt for the resulting corruption of nature. Shedd finds it unreasonable to say that an effect can be imputed but not a cause. He rightly puts out via Turretin, that if only the corruption of humanity is imputed to us, then Adam’s first sin of disobedience to God is never properly dealt with at. I agree with Shedd and Turretin that it is impossible to impute the effect without also imputing the cause. For example, it would surely be unjust to find D liable for a death by murder if D was not, vicariously or otherwise, the cause of the murder. D must in some way, be the cause of V’s death, if he is to be found guilty of murder.
(2) How does original sin affect our understanding?
Answer: Shedd argues that sin blinds and darkens our understanding by destroying our consciousness of divine things. Our knowledge of the love of God becomes hearsay knowledge, rather than something we can bear direct witness to. In addition, our conscience becomes insensible and stupefied. Shedd asserts that mythology is the product of reason polluted by sin.
- Corruption of Nature as Guilt (568-570)
(1) What is the strongest argument Shedd offers to support the idea that corruption of nature is guilt?
Answer: Shedd gives number of strong arguments to support the idea that corruption of nature is guilt and it is difficult to choose one of six strong arguments out of the nine total arguments. Possibly the strongest however, is the argument that the corruption of nature is guilt because it is the inclination of the will. As explained earlier, it is voluntary, though not volitionary. Shedd states it is conceded that the inclination to murder is as truly culpable as the act of murder.
Whilst temporal guilt cannot be attributed to mere thoughts, Jesus himself is quite clear that we are guilty in God’s eyes for thoughts such as, for instance, when we look at a woman with lust in our hearts. We are inclined towards such things and surely our guilty is assured for being so.
(2) What is the weakest argument Shedd offers to support the idea that corruption of nature is guilt?
Answer: Shedd’s weakest argument to support the idea that corruption of nature is guilt is the argument that the remainders of corruption in the regenerate are hated as sin by the regenerate himself and by God who slays them by his Spirit. Though this may well be a true statement, it fails to define terms well enough to stand as an argument on its own. When placed alongside the other arguments, the context can be understood, but without the support of the other arguments, it lacks explanatory scope and power.
- Original Sun and Moral Inability (577-592)
(1) What is meant by the term “moral inability”?
Answer: Moral inability is connected with the disposition and inclination of the will. Humankind is inclined towards evil and disinclined towards good. The inclination of the will is therefore a voluntary faculty, embracing sin and demonstrating a moral or willing inability to incline towards God.
But ‘moral’ inability does not arise simply from habit or that it is not natural. It is actually physically impossible for him to be holy as a result of a natural inclination inherited from Adam. This inclination is not created through the agency of God, but voluntary, through the agency of Adam’s apostasy.
(2) How does Shedd distinguish the concepts of “ability” and “capability”?
Answer: The concept of “ability” properly denotes efficient power. Thus, when attributed to the human will, the question is whether mankind has the ability to effect power over the will such that it has use and control of this faculty. But since, due to a moral inability to incline the will towards God, one cannot speak of natural ability in such terms as it pertains to the will.
“Capability” implies possibility only. For example, man is capable of loving God supremely, but he is not able to love supremely. When one refers to ability, Shedd explains that he is probably referring to capability only. Something more than a mere capability is needed to warrant a claim to have an ability to do something.
(3) How do the concepts of “moral necessity” and “habitus” relate to the issue of moral inability?
Answer: Both Calvin and Augustine assert the concept of “moral necessity”. Shedd defines moral necessity as that necessity in the moral character of the volitions that arises from a habitus of the will. The habitus is a bias or disposition of the voluntary faculty. Such a disposition will intensify or confirm free voluntary action rather than weaken it because it is a vehement and total determination. This sinful disposition explains the moral inability of the sinner to incline rightly to a holy inclination because he is already self-determinedly inclined towards evil.
(4) Regarding the grounds of moral inability, which of the grounds is the most convincing? Why?
Answer: Shedd gives at least four grounds for moral inability but the first ground he gives it possibly the most convincing due to its elegant simplicity. Shedd explains that a holy inclination must originate in and proceed from God, as he is the source of all holiness. Man can no more originate holiness than the spiritual substance itself of the will can be. Thus, even the unfallen man is morally unable to incline towards holiness due to anything originating out of himself. Think therefore, how even more true this comment is in relation to man as sinful creature. With a sinful nature, he is even less able than he was before inclining toward holiness because now has been stupefied and polluted by sin.
- Moral Inability and Moral Obligation (592-602)
(1) What is the strongest argument Shedd offers to demonstrate that moral inability and moral obligation are coherent and compatible ideas?
Answer: Having already defined moral inability, man’s moral obligation is to perfectly obey the divine law, having been endowed by the Creator with the holiness and plenary power to good. As creatures in God’s Image, man was obliged to sinless obedience. His will and his holy inclination were married to the task of obedience.
We see thusly that man’s obligations are founded upon the Creator gifts of holinss and plenary power to do good. Man’s destruction of those gifts in voluntary rebellion from God has rendered him morally unable to incline towards God but the voluntary destruction by man of his gifts from God in no way releases him from his obligations to God. Shedd strongly argues that it does not follow that the voluntary loss of ability to fulfil an obligation, in any way weakens the obligations put upon him to fulfil it. In law, for example, we do not release a drunken man of his obligation not to commit murder, simply because his voluntary drunkenness results in him bludgeoning a person to death in a drunken rage.
(2) What is the weakest argument Shedd offers to demonstrate that moral inability and moral obligation are coherent and compatible ideas.
Answer: I do not accept that any of these arguments are weak. Shedd gives excellent rebuttals to every objection levelled against the coherence and compatibility of moral inability and moral obligation.
B. Part 5: Christology (The Doctrine of Christ)
1. Christ’s Theanthropic Person
b. Christ’s Divine Nature and the Second Trinitarian Person (615-616)
(1) Did the entire Trinity become incarnate in Christ? Explain.
Answer: The entire Trinity did not become incarnate in Christ. Only the second person of the Trinity, the eternal Son or Logos “…was made flesh.” The Godhead is the divine essence in all three modes. The essence present in all three modes did not become incarnate because that would mean all three modes would become incarnate also. This is improper because it is revealed to us that only the Divine Son became incarnate. The divine person of the Son assumed a human nature in Jesus Christ. Only the Son’s particular mode of the divine nature became incarnate. As Shedd explains, the paternity of the Father and process of the Holy Spirit do not belong to Jesus Christ and were thus not part of the Incarnation.
(3) What is the best reason Shedd gives for the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity, rather than the First or Third Person? Explain.
Answer: Shedd lists reasons originally offered by Paraeus for the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity, rather than the First or Third Person. The strongest of these reasons is the fittingness of God’s adoption of man through the incarnation of his natural Son. The Son is commissioned and sent by the Father upon a mission of mercy to deliver man from the effects of his rebellion and draw him back into a loving relationship with the Father.
c. Incarnation vs, Transmutation (616-617)
(1) What is the essential difference between the concept of “incarnation” and the concept of “transmutation”?
Answer: The essential difference between the two concepts is that transmutation involved a change from one substance into another substance. The divine substance would change into a human substance. The concept of Incarnation acknowledges that that the Divine substance with all its attendant properties remains unchanged. The Divine substance of God instead united Himself with the human nature of man, resulting in a human form of consciousness that was also divine.
(2) Why is it important to make this distinction?
Answer: It is important to make this distinction in order to understand and appreciate the Incarnation as the unification of two natures so as to constitute one single person, as opposed to the idea of God ‘turning into’ man. God becomes humanized and suffers with us. But his substance retains its own properties. In the God-man, the divine nature remains divine in its properties and the human remains human.
d. Christ as a Single Person in Two Natures (617)
(1) What is a Theanthropic person?
Answer: A theanthropic person is a person with three natures, namely, the divine essence, a human soul and a human body. By the Incarnation, a God-man is constituted. He is a Trinitarian person that has been modified by union with a human nature. He is constituted by the union of diverse natures.
(2) How many natures does a Theanthropic person have?
Answer: The Theanthopic person has two natures – the incarnation of the Son of God consists of a union of natures between the divine nature of the Logos with a human nature derived from a human mother which produced the divine human person, Jesus Christ. Before that union occurred, there was no theanthropic personality. The second person of the Trinity is infinite but the theanthropic personality of Jesus Christ began at the Incarnation.
e. Divine Nature as the Root of Christ’s Person (617-623)
(1) What is Shedd’s best argument to support the notion that the divine nature is the root of Christ’s person?
Answer: Shedd’s best argument to support the notion that the divine nature is the root of Christ’s person is that had it not been so, he would have been a man-God and not a God-man. Shedd rightly points out that the error of Paul of Samosata, Photinus and Marcellus was in believing that that complex person of Jesus Christ was anthropotheistic and not theanthropic. They mistakenly thought that base of Christ’s person was human nature, when the reality is that Christ is humanized deity and not deified humanity. From this recognition, all other arguments can flow, including the co-supporting strong argument that the antheanthropic personality was not destroyed by the death of the human Christ. The union between human soul and body was temporarily separated by death, but the Logos bound both of them to Himself at all times.
(2) How does the illustration of a biblical prophet assist in the explaining the ignorance of Christ?
Answer: Shedd uses the illustration of a biblical prophet to assist in explaining how Jesus Christ could grow in knowledge as a man whilst his nature was in union with the omniscient nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. Shedd parallels the union of Jesus’s mind in relation to the Logos as similar to the relation of the prophets’ minds with the Holy Spirit. Though dissimilar in the fact that Jesus and the Logos’ mind constitute one person, versus the two person union of prophet and Spirit, they were alike in their dependence for knowledge. As Isaiah could not know more of the secrets of God than the Holy Spirit deigned to reveal to him, neither was the mind of the Logos accessible to Jesus beyond which the Logos allowed. This was part of the humiliation endured by the Logos, that he put himself into union with an inferior nature, such that his infinite perfections could only, as Shedd puts it, “shine through in part.”
(3) How does the illustration of “forgetfulness of the ordinary man” help explain the ignorance of Christ?
Answer: A second way that Shedd explains the ignorance of Christ is by using the illustration of the “forgetfulness of the ordinary man.” Shedd argues that no man holds every past memory in his mind so that it is immediately accessible at each and every moment of his consciousness. But this is not to say that he is absolutely ignorant of his past, merely relatively ignorant of that which has come before in his life. If Jesus was ignorant of the time and day of judgment, Shedd opines that he may subsequently have come to know it as his human nature increased in knowledge through the illumination of the divine.
g. Incarnation and Divine Immutability (624-626)
(1) How does Shedd explain the immutability of the Trinity in light of the fact that the Second Person of the Trinity became incarnate?
Answer: Shedd asserts that the constitution (i.e. immutability) of the Trinity is unchanged by the fact that the Second Person of the Trinity became incarnate. He explains that whilst the Son is much modified by the incarnation in order to become the God-man, he retains his Trinitarian personality. Rather, by the human assumption of a divine person, humanity is changed and glorified by Christ. The Trinity is not divine-human, only the God-man is. But such a union of the Logos with human nature does not change the Trinitarian nature of the Logos, for Incarnation, as Shedd explains, in not transubstantiation. He possesses a divine nature that is capable of a two-fold mode of existence, as both consciousness and agency. The Son of Man condescends to exists and act on earth as a human being whilst retaining his divine untrammelled existence in heaven simultaneously.
h. Incarnation as the Assumption of Nature, not a Person (626-633)
(1) What is the essential difference between a human nature and a human person?
Answer: Shedd cites Scripture to argue that in the Incarnation, the Logos did not unite itself with a human person, but with a human nature. From Scripture are derived the terms ‘seed’ and ‘flesh and blood’ which imply that the Logos assumed into personal union with an un-individualized human nature. Human nature is a real substance that has physical, rational, moral and spiritual properties. Human nature is capable of becoming a human person but must be personalized in order to do so. Shedd explains that a human person is “a fractional part of a specific human nature or substance which has been separated from the common mass and formed into a distinct and separate individual by the process of generation. Prior to separation and formation, the human nature is not personal. As such, the term ‘nature’ is a more impersonal term than the term ‘person’. Human nature is less personal than a human person.
i. Sanctification of Christ’s Human Nature (633-640)
(1) According to Shedd, how does the “mode of conception” relation to the sanctification of Christ’s human nature?
Answer: The “mode of conception” relates to the sanctification of Christ’s human nature in that when the Word was made flesh, it was sinless and perfect. Theologians assert the sinfulness of the virgin Mary and the consequent sinful nature of humanity as transmitted by her and the need and the consequent need for redemption and sanctification. And yet, through the miraculous agency of the Holy Spirit, Christ was born without sin, in spite of Mary’s inherent sinful nature. A part of human nature becomes a human person by means of generation. Ordinary generation produces sin. But in the case of Christ, there was no union of the sexes. Shedd explains that the quickening of the a portion of the human nature in Mary’s body was by the Holy Spirit and was not exposed to the transmission of Adam’s sin. The substance of Mary was sanctified by a miraculous act of God and the result was the human soul and body of Jesus Christ.
4. Christ’s Unipersonality
c. Christ’s Twofold Consciousness (651-653)
(1) How does Shedd explain Christ’s twofold consciousness?
Answer: Christ’s consciousness is both human and divine, existing within the same person. This is explained by the fact that there are two natures in Christ. He possesses both human nature – that which is hungry and feels pain and the divine nature, which has the power to command the dead to rise. Christ experiences a continual fluctuation of consciousness between human and divine, according to which is uppermost in his self-consciousness. At one moment Christ is weak and finite, at others he is infinite and all-powerful.
e. Hypostatic Union and the Two Wills in Christ (656-657)
(1) Explain how Monothelitism is a modified form of Eutychianism.
Answer: The Christian doctrine of the ‘hypostatic union’ is understood as the personal union of two nature’s in Christ’s person. The two natures or substances constitute one personal substance. This doctrine of two natures in the God-man implies that He also has two wills and either would be complete without the voluntary quality of property in it. Each nature has all its essential elements, and thus voluntariness is as essential as rationality. However, Monothelitism denied the two natures/two wills doctrine and argued that the two natures had only a theanthropic will between them. The union of natures produced one will that was neither human nor divine, but divine-human. Thus, by a conversion of the two natures Monothelitism produced a third species of nature that was neither human nor divine. In this way, it was a modified Eutychianism.
(2) How can Christ have two wills and yet possess a single self-consciousness?
Answer: Catholic theologians corrected the Monethelitic error of one will in two natures by affirming the intimate personal union of the two natures, neither of which would work without the other’s participation in the efficiency. When Christ’s human will acts, the divine submits itself to humiliation. When Christ’s divine will acts, the human nature of man is exalted. There is no antagonism between the human and divine wills because by God’s agency the human will was born sinless. There are thus two wills but one resulting action, brought about by the self-conscious agency of God. The divine will of God works in the regenerate will of man to bring about acts through the will, but there is not, according to Shedd, duality in the self-consciousness of the regenerate man.
5. Christ’s Impeccability
c. Christ’s Impeccability Proven from the Constitution of His Person (660-662)
(1) Why is it improper to speak of Christ as being both “peccable and impeccable”?
Answer: Christ’s divine nature is both intemptable and impeccable. God thus, cannot things that are inconsistent with his nature. For example, God cannot lie. Human beings are both temptable and peccable. When these natures are brought into hypostatic union, it is the divine nature that determines and controls the human, rather than the human controlling the divine. Thus, Christ’s ability to overcome temptation to sin is estimated by his divinity, because it is this and not his humanity that provides the base and dominates the person of Christ. The divine aspect prevents Christ’s human aspect from falling. Shedd explains that “Divine impeccability characterizes the God-man as a totality, while peccability is a property of his humanity.” The reason the God-man cannot be both peccable and impeccable when he can, for example be both ignorant and omniscient, is that the divine nature cannot abandon the human nature, for otherwise the human nature, left to its own devices would commit sin. But the divine nature is joined in union with the human nature and thus it too would be implicated in sin if the God-man were to yield to temptation. The impeccable nature of the divine therefore must never desert the human nature of Christ.
d. Impeccability Consistent with Temptability (662-665)
(1) How can Christ simultaneously be both impeccable and temptable?
Answer: It has been charged by critics of Christ’s impeccability that if it is impossible for him to sin, then it cannot be said that he was truly tempted. Shedd points out the illogic of this statement by noting it is akin to say that an army that cannot be defeated, cannot be attacked. He rightly points out that temptability depends upon “the constitutional susceptibility” and that the human nature in Christ was perfectly susceptible to all forms of natural temptation. However, his impeccability prevented him from acting upon those temptations and giving into sin.
A. Part 6: Soteriology (The Doctrine of Salvation)
1. Christ’s Mediatorial Offices
b. Some Characteristics of Christ as Mediator (675-681)
(1) Summarize this section of Shedd.
Answer: In this section Shedd explores some characteristics of Christ as Mediator in order to avoid misconception as to what such mediatorial offices entail. First, the mediator between God and man cannot be God only or man only, but must be related to both and the equal of either. To be the mediator between God and man, the eternal Word must take man’s nature into union with himself. Shedd then gives several reasons why the office of a mediator between God and man is one of condescension and humiliation. First and foremost, it involves the assumption of a human nature by a divine person. A second reason is that to be a mediator between God and man implies a condition of dependence – the second person of the Trinity consents to a lowly office as an ambassador to humankind. Third, the office of the mediator is temporary. It began in time and will end at a certain point of time also. Fourthly, the office of the mediator is one of reward, in that the assumption of a finite nature is an exercise in the humiliation of the Logos that is to be recompensed. Finally, because the Second Person of the Trinity agrees to become subordinate by taking this mediatorial position, this shows that He was not originally subordinate.
Shedd then explains the difference between the covenant of grace and the covenant of redemption. The former is made between the Father and the elect whereas the latter is made between the Father and the Son. The two covenants are simply two modes of one evangelical covenant of mercy, with only a secondary distinction between them. Shedd ends this section with a general discussion of the differences of opinion between noted theologians respecting the validity of this distinction.
d. Christ’s Prophetic Office (682-685)
(1) Give a definition of the prophetic office of Christ?
Answer: The prophetic office of Christ is to be the source and teacher of those divinely revealed truths relating to the whole will of God as it pertains to human redemption.
(2) How is Christ’s prophetic office distinguished from the biblical prophets’ (e.g., Isaiah)?
Answer: Christ is fully conscious of his infallibility. He shows no trace of the abashment experienced by mere human prophets when they come into the presence of deity and receive communications from him. Jesus spoke as one having the authority of the divine in himself. He speaks directly and personally, as no man ever spoke and spoke face to face to man. His works as well as his words taught man of the divine truth. Christ also executed his office mediately through the Holy Spirit. As earlier prophets had prophesied of the grace that would come through Christ, Jesus preached by this Holy Spirit and is revealed as the source of all written and unwritten revelation.
e. Christ’s Priestly Office (685-688)
(1) Define the priestly office of Christ?
Answer: The priestly office of Christ is as a mediator appointed to officiate between God and man in religious matters. It is mainly expiatory and reconciling, given that sin is the cardinal fact in man’s case.
(2) How does Christ administer his office?
Answer: In offering himself as a sacrifice to God whilst he himself is innocent, Christ is administering his priestly office as the sacrifice is performed in order to achieve reconciliation between God and sinful man, and make continual intercession on their behalf.
(3) How is the administration of Christ’s priestly office distinct from His administration of the prophetic office?
Answer: The prophetic office was administered mediately whereas Christ’s priestly office is administered directly. It is delegated to no other but is taken on exclusively in the unique and solitary character of Christ. The two parts of His priestly work are atonement and intercession.
2. Vicarious Atonement
a. Atonement as Substitutionary (690-696)
(1) Summarize the difference between personal and vicarious atonement.
Answer: The atonement achieved by Christ is intended and accomplished for the sake of all of humankind, rather than Christ Himself. By laying down his life as a sacrifice and offering to a just and holy God, Christ’s vicarious atonement is regarded as the personal atonement of believer. Christ died in both the sinner’s place and for his benefit, making him both substitute and redeemer. Retributive justice for the sins of mankind would be satisfied if the entire human race were punished forever. But since God is also merciful as well as just, he manifested the “greatest and strangest mercy that can be conceived of, for the vicarious atonement of Christ is the sovereign and the judge putting himself in the place of the criminal.”
Shedd is careful to distinguish between personal atonement, which is made by the guilty party; and vicarious atonement, which is made by the innocent victim of the criminal party. There is no mercy in personal atonement, but vicarious atonement is the highest form of mercy for it obtains eternal life with God for the sinner. If a sinner merely suffered a penalty for his crime, he is then lost forever. However, the mercy of God incarnate is such that through His own suffering and death, the sinner is saved forever.
(2) Why does the Socinian assertion that vicarious atonement is unmerciful lack force or merit?
Answer: Shedd completes this section by pointing out the flaws in the Socinian objection that God makes no real self sacrifice it really it is His Son that suffers and not Himself. In fact, the First Person of the Trinity does experience self-sacrifice by surrendering his Beloved Son who will then also commit self-sacrifice by consenting to suffering humiliation and death. It is thus inaccurate to assert that the First Person does not experience true suffering.
Such suffering is also compatible with a divine essence being incapable of suffering, for whilst no external thing can cause the divine essence to suffer, there is no logical contradiction in the divine essence voluntarily committing an act of self-sacrifice which involves His suffering.
b. Atonement as Suffering and Forgiveness as Its Result (696-699)
(1) Summarise this section of Shedd.
Answer: To understand the priestly office of Christ requires a clear and accurate conception of the nature of atonement. The essence of atonement is found in the suffering. The atonement offering must experience agony before death. Equally however, the person who makes the offering must not experience any enjoyment out of inflicting this pain and death. It must be a loss for him also. Christ voluntarily accepts the full agony of torture, crucifixion and death specifically so that the criminal humanity may escape the suffering they ought to experience as a result of sin.
As a result of this atoning death suffered by the sinner’s atoning substitute, divine wrath is propitiated and the punishment due to sin is not inflicted upon the guilty party. It is important to note that the non-infliction of penalty is “forgiveness” in the biblical representation. It is highly important also to note that Scripture knows nothing of forgiveness in isolation but rather, it always has a foregoing reason. There is no remission of penalty without a vicarious shedding of blood. Propitiation by atonement must precede forgiveness. The innocent must suffer to atone for the guilt of the guilty. Without atonement, there would only be an abolition of a penalty, rather than a remission of it.
We see that in the Biblical view, divine mercy is more in the cause than in the effect. It is the atonement that costs, rather than the forgiveness. Shedd admonishes us therefore to seek the center of divine mercy in the work of atonement rather than in the work of forgiveness.
e. Christ’s Sufferings as Penal Substitution (711-720)
(1) Explain the difference between calamity, chastisement, and punishment.
Answer: According to Shedd, calamity, chastisement and punishment refer to three kinds of suffering, which we have seen, is the inmost essence of atonement. Calamity befalls man by the providence of God, occurring only in the sinful world and always associated either with chastisement or with punishment. It is therefore, an element in suffering rather than the whole suffering. Chastisement is associated with calamity, as when a calamity falls upon a child of God. Likewise, punishment is also associated with calamity falls on an unrepentant sinner. Thus, whilst chastisement and punishment involve direct suffering, each is coupled with the essential element of calamity in suffering.
(2) What is the purpose of chastisement?
Answer: The ultimate purpose of calamity is shrouded in mystery for it is grounded in the providence of God but the purpose of chastisement is clear and unambiguous. Shedd explains that its purpose is discipline and moral improvement for the purpose of reform. It is administered, not with judicial severity, but with the affection of a parent. As children of God the Father, we are chastised not for the purpose of retribution, but for personal improvement.
(3) What is the purpose of punishment?
Answer: The purpose of punishment is to inflict pain because of guilt. Its intent is to satisfy justice. The law of requital demands that justice be served through the infliction of punishment. The individual is not permitted to punish, but Christ mandated that both God and government (which is ordained of God) are permitted to dispassionately and rightly inflict pain upon the individual in retribution for his guilt. The primary aim of punishment is the satisfaction of justice at the expense of the deserving criminal. To preserve the righteousness of punishment, it must always be meted out in direct proportion to the offence.
(1) Did Jesus experience the emotional wrath of God
Answer: Jesus did not experience the emotional wrath of God for Jesus was holy, harmless, undefiled and separate from sinners and the emotional wrath of God is reserved against only those of personal unrighteousness. Though God smote the Son and experienced, “the wrath of God” it is accurate to say that he experienced a judicial suffering caused by a loving and tender God, carried out for a particular purpose. That purpose is rightly referred to as wrath because it is judicial and penal, but God was never emotionally angry with the Son in whom he was always well pleased. He loved the Son whilst committing a wrathful act against Him.
f. Christ’s Active and Passive Obedience (720-722)
(1) What is the distinction between Active Obedience and Passive Obedience?
Answer: Christ’s passive obedience denotes the whole of the pain and suffering Christ experienced during the humiliation of his human and earthly career. The suffering is referred to as ‘obedience’ because of the voluntariness of his substitution for the sins of humankind. Christ’s active obedience refers to his sinless, perfect performance of God’s moral law whilst he dwelt among us. Both active and passive obedience enter into the sum total of Christ’s atoning work. His humiliation was atoning and his performance of the law was humiliating. Thus the two elements of obedience, whilst distinct, cannot be entirely separated from each other.
g. Atonement and Its Necessity in Relation to Divine Justice (722-728)
(1) How does atonement cancel a legal claim?
Answer: The atoning sufferings and death of Christ are related only to the attribute of God’s retributive Justice for it demands the necessary punishment of sin. Mercy is optional, but Justice must be exercised one way or the other. The transgressor must be punished or else a substitute to bear the penalty for his transgression in his stead. The necessity of atonement is absolute, not relative. However, the natural and necessary correlation between vicarious atonement and justice means that the former is capable of cancelling a legal claim.
(2) If atonement cancels guilt, then why is it that the vicarious atonement of Christ does not save all men indiscriminately, as the Universalist contends?
Answer: The reason why the vicarious atonement of Christ does not save all men indiscriminately, as the Universalist contends is that the relation of Christ’s atonement to God’s Justice is a very different thing from the relation of the individual person to Christ’s atonement. For Christ’s atonement that provides propitiation for the sins of the whole world to apply to the individual person, he must be penitent. If he refuses to believe and rejects the atonement, then the infinite benefit of the cancelled legal claim does not apply to him. For as Shedd states, “vicarious atonement without faith is powerless to save.” The act of atonement merely satisfies the legal debts. It is the trusting in that which has been satisfied on his behalf that saves the sinner. Without such trust, the atonement of Christ is a mere historical fact without application to the sinner.
No man was entitled to salvation. He had nothing to do with making the atonement. Christ did it all and he gets to make the rules, not us, as to how it is to be imputed. Even the act of faith does not intrinsically entitle the believer to the benefit. It is only the promise of Christ that he would impute it to those who believe, that the believer receives the benefit.
(1) How does Shedd answer the objection that it is unjust to exact a personal penalty from any individual member of the human race if a vicarious penalty equal in value to that due from the human race has already been paid to justice?
Answer: When a man is punished for his own sins, he gets what he deserves and there is no injustice in this. Just because vicarious atonement has been made, that does not entitle him automatically to their benefit, unless he was the author of the atonement, which he of course is not.
h. Atonement in Its Relation to Divine Mercy (728-732)
(1) How is vicarious satisfaction a mode of divine mercy?
Answer: Vicarious satisfaction is a mode of divine mercy because it unites both mercy and justice into one divine act. Mercy is granted by suffering in place of the sinner, whilst justice is satisfied by the full penalty being inflicted on the vicarious sufferer.
Vicarious satisfaction is also the highest mode of divine mercy because it is mercy in the form of self sacrifice. When God bestows his mercy in other ways, such as when he makes the rain fall, he shows mercy, but this is an inferior form of mercy because it involves no self-sacrifice. The vicarious satisfaction derived from substituting god for man, humiliating and crucifying a person of the Trinity, this is the highest conceivable act of mercy.
(2) Why is vicarious satisfaction of justice the only possible mode of exercising divine mercy?
Answer: Vicarious satisfaction of justice is the only possible mode of exercising divine mercy because God, being both perfectly Just and Perfectly Merciful, must act in a way that is consistent with these two attributes. Justice cannot be waived, mere forbearance is not possible. Justice must be satisfied and therefore if God wishes to be merciful he must find someone both capable and willing to pay the price for the sin of mankind. That person can only be Himself.
i. Possibility of Substitution (732-739)
(1) How is the Calvinistic theory of the “relaxation” of justice different from the Scotus’s and Grotius’s theory of the “relaxation” of justice?
Answer: The exercise of sovereignty by God in permitting substitution of penalty has been referred to by some Calvinistic theologians of the “relaxation” of justice. But such a relaxation refers not to the penalty, but to the person enduring it. The penalty demanded remains unabated, but justice is satisfied by allowing another to suffer the penalty in the place of the transgressor. Scotus’s and Grotius’s use of the term “relaxation” refers instead however to a relaxation in respect to the amount of the penalty, in addition to the person enduring it. On their view, God can by volitionary decision accepted a substitute of inferior value.
(2) Explain how the concepts of “equivalency” and “identity” relate to the possibility of penal substitution.
Answer: Penal substitution requires suffering by the substitute to be of equal value as that which is warranted by the offence. Equal value is not the same as identical. Identical means the same in every respect and this is impossible because remorse can only be experienced by the guilty punishee rather than an innocent substitute.
Christ’s suffering is of equal value with that of all mankind but it is of a different quality. It is equivalent in quantity, but it is a different quality of differing. Christ suffers differently from mankind, but he suffers equally.
j. Extent of Atonement (739-750)
(1) Why is it important to distinguish “atonement” from “redemption” with respect to understanding the issue of the extent of the atonement?
Answer: It is important to distinguish “atonement” from “redemption” with respect to understanding the issue of the extent of the atonement because redemption includes the application of the atonement. Redemption includes reconciliation with god and inheritance of the kingdom of heaven, appropriated by faith of the benefit’s of Christ’s atoning work. Atonement is unlimited and applied through redemption. Thus redemption is limited to the church and is limited to those whom accept God’s gracious gift by faith.
k. Universal Offer of Atonement (750-754)
(1) How does Shedd understand the notion of a universal offer of salvation?
Answer: Shedd understands that the atonement of Christ is not intended to be universally but that it is universally offered. Shedd lists a number of reasons for this: First, the universality of the offer is a divine command; second, no offer of the atonement is possible but a universal offer; third, the atonement is sufficient in value to expiate the sin of all men indiscriminately; fourth, God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement in the instance of the nonelect; fifth, the atonement of Christ is to be offered indiscriminately because God desires that every man would believe in it; sixth, it is the nonelect himself and not God, who prevents the efficacy of the atonement; seventh, rather than call upon people to believe they are elect, God calls upon people to believe that God died for sin and that the Christ’s name alone is sufficient to atone for sin; eighth, the preacher is to hope and expect from God the best and not the worst for every man; nine, even the unelect receive benefits and blessings from it.
Shedd lists three more reasons with reference to man’s relation to the offer. First, the atonement is universal because it is the duty of every man to trust in it. Second, it should be universal because it is the most impressive mode of preaching the law. Third, The aversion and obstinacy of the unbeliever’s will is revealed by the offer.
3. Regeneration
b. Various Uses of the Term Regeneration (761-763)
(1) How is regeneration related to conversion?
Answer: Regeneration and conversion have wrongly been treated almost as synonyms. Regeneration is the act of God that gives new life to man. Conversion is the process undertaken by the reborn man. God is thus, the cause of regeneration and conversion is the effect of that act.
c. Characteristics of Regeneration (764-773)
(1) How does “renewal” relate to regeneration?
Answer: Renewal is that part of regeneration that refers to the human will. It refers to the new inclination of man, by the power of the Holy Spirit, towards God and away from his sinful nature.
(2) What is Shedd’s single best argument to support the claim that man cannot cooperate in regeneration? Why?
Answer: Shedd’s single best argument that man cannot cooperate in regeneration is precipitated by fact of man’s inability to be willing in the direction of holiness, due to our self-determined inclination towards sin as the result of Adam’s rebellion. Man is thus hostile to God and cannot cooperate in his own regeneration. It must be a direct action by the Holy Spirit that over-rides the sinful hostility of man and brings it in concert with holiness. This argument from man’s hostility is logical based on what Shedd has written earlier in relation to anthropology.
(3) What is Shedd’s single best argument to support the claim that regeneration is not effected by the use of means? Why?
Answer: Shedd’s single best argument here presupposes that (2) is correct, in that there are no means or instruments within the soul to bring about regeneration. Prior to a direct act by God, man cannot understand nor is can he believe by force of will. These two principal faculties are bereft of any vital force to bring out regeneration without God.
d. Man’s Agency in Regeneration (773-782)
(1) Regarding man’s agency in regeneration, how is the Augustinian use of the term “preparative” distinguished from the Semi-Pelagian use of the word?
Answer: The Augustian meaning of the term “preparative” is conviction of sin, guilt and hopeless. Whereas the Semi-Palagian used the term to mean a preparative disposition or a favouring state of the heart.
4. Conversion (787-791)
a. Questions
(1) What is conversion?
Answer: Conversion is that action of man which results from regeneration. It is the turning toward a certain point and away from a certain point.
(2) How is conversion distinguished from faith, regeneration and justification?
Answer: Conversion is in two acts, firstly consisting of faith in Christ as the ground of justification and away from oneself. This is inseparably accompanied with repentance, which is the act of turning to God as the chief end of one’s existence, again as opposed to oneself. Faith is an effect of which regeneration is the cause.
5. Justification (793-800)
a. Preliminary Considerations (793-796)
(1) Why are the active obedience and the passive obedience of Christ necessary for the justification of the sinner?
Answer: Both active and passive obedience of Christ were necessary for the justification of the sinner because together they characterize the righteousness of God. Christi’s vicarious suffering and obedience of the law that man has broken and his atoning for man’s sin and acquisition for him of eternal life, demonstrate both forms of obedience.
b. Justification: Its Characteristics and Results (796-800)
(1) Briefly summarize and state the six characteristics and results of justification discussed in this section of Shedd.
First, faith is the instrumental and not the procuring or meritorious cause of man’s justification. God imputes the obedience and satisfaction of Christ. Second, A man is justified by faith and without deeds. His justification is solely by Christ’s satisfaction. Third, with a single act of God, justification is instantaneous and complete. Fourth, all sins in the past, present and future are pardoned in the one all comprehending act of God. Though God never repeats the justification, the believer experiences God’s constant pardoning for sins as he goes through life, as well as paternal chastisement and consequences for his sin. Fifth, the sinner is granted eternal life as well as pardoning from a deserved fate. Sixth, justification is a means to an end which lies in sanctification.
6. Sanctification (803-806
a. How is sanctification distinguished from regeneration?
Answer: Sanctification refers to the continuing agency of the Holy Spirit in the sinner’s life after regeneration. The Spirit sanctifies thorough strengthening and augmenting existing virtues and excited them to exercise.
b. How sanctification related to justification?
Answer: Sanctification affects the heart, mind and spiritual soul of the regenerated man. It is gradual and incomplete and done in cooperation with God. Once started, it is never lost, though set-backs can occur. Justification naturally tends to sanctification. It supplies the only effective motive to obedience. Knowledge of his gracious pardoning of us for our sins is the strongest motivation for man to cooperate in his sanctification through the work of the Holy Spirit.
B. Part 7: Eschatology (The Doctrine of the Last Things)
1. Intermediate or Disembodied State
a. Summary of the Doctrine (831-833)
(1) Why did the Protestant Reformers reject patristic and medieval understanding of the intermediate state?
Answer: The patristic and medieval understanding of the intermediate state was that without a resurrected body, the disembodied spirit was held in a state of imperfection, whether that state be imperfect happiness or imperfect grief, depending on whether they were saved or lost. The Protestant Reformers adhered closely to Scripture and thereby rejected this corporeal incompleteness of the intermediate state and affirmed both perfect happiness and perfect misery. The intermediate state for the saved is heaven without a body and the perfected state is heaven with the body. The intermediate state for the damned is hell without a body and then hell with a body. Heaven and hell, with no room for Hades or Paradise, are the only two places that exist.
c. Christ’s Alleged Descent into Hell (838-850)
(1) Why does Shedd reject the “descended into Hell” clause of the Apostles’ Creed?
Answer: Shedd considers the clause to be a stimulant to the growth of the doctrine of hades, leading to tortured exegesis of Scripture to find support for the spurious doctrine. Shedd finds no support for it either in Scripture or any of the first ecumenical creeds, though it does derive support from patristic authority. He regards the total silence of the four Gospels and Paul’s evidence ignorance of hades to be fatal to the tenet.
d. Scriptural View of the Intermediate State (842-850)
(1) What is the best argument Shedd offers to prove that the Old Testament teaches the concept of the immortality of the soul and its separate existence from the body after death?
Answer: Shedd’s best argument is to point out that the messianic matter of the Old Testament is reduced to absurdity on the supposition that the soul is mortal. He points out that to redeem from a sin a being whose consciousness expires at death would be superfluous.
3. Resurrection
a. Historical Considerations (867-869)
(1) How is the doctrine of Transmigration distinguished from the doctrine of Resurrection?
Answer: The doctrine of Transmigration envisions the soul going into another body than its own, including both animal and human bodies. This cycling of the soul would carry on until it had reached a level of holiness that allowed it to be absorbed into the divine essence. Resurrection taught that our old body is renewed and perfected and our soul is returned to it and no other.
b. Scriptural Teaching on the Resurrection (869-873)
(1) What is a “spiritual body”?
Answer: A spiritual body is a body adapted to the future spiritual world.
(2) What is the distinction between a “natural body” and a “spiritual body”?
Answer: The natural body is antithetic to the spiritual body. The natural body is the presented earthly body suited to the present sensuous world. It is not body converted into spirit.
4. Final Judgment (878-880)
(1) How is the private judgment at death distinguishable from the public judgment on the last day?
Answer: Scripture teaches that the private judgment occurs at death when the human spirit encounters God as it never has before. There is self-consciousness and self-knowledge at this moment. He knows his own moral character and will either acquit or convict himself at death. The character and destiny remain unchanged til the last day of public final judgment whereupon he will go before God and his memories will all come before him in rapid succession and he will accuse or excuse himself.
5. Heaven (882-883)
(1) How did Augustine understand the relationship of sin and death to heavenly happiness?
Answer: Augustine understood that heavenly happiness consisted in the enjoyment of peace which passes knowledge and the beatific vision of God
(2) What are the four scriptural representations of the heavenly state?
Answer: First, the heavenly state is marked by sinless perfection. Second, it is marked by impeccability or indefectibility. Third, the heavenly state consists chiefly of mental happiness in seeing the face of God. Fourth, the heavenly state is the personal presence of the mediator with his redeemed people.
6. Hell
b. Biblical Argument (888-911)
(1) What is the most persuasive biblical argument that Shedd offers to prove that Hell is a place and state of eternal conscious punishment?
Answer: It is Jesus Christ Himself who is responsible for the doctrine of eternal perdition. Shedd points out that the doctrine originated with Him and not with any later writings of the Church. Shedd argues it is an ever-lasting state most effectively in his examination of the word ‘aion’ whereas his best argument that it involves conscious punishment is to point out that it is not in the nature of punishment to be inflicted on an unconscious mind. To be punished, one must feel and experience it, whilst knowing they deserve it.
c. Rational Argument (911-933)
(1) According to the rationalistic critic, why should the doctrine of Hell be removed “from the sphere of rational belief”? (911)
Answer: The rationalistic argument is that although Christ, Paul and John all taught the doctrine of eternal punishment, in light of God’s attributes and the nature of the soul. The rationalist argues that the destination of Man and God’s infinite goodness conflict to such an enormous degree with eternal punishment, that belief in the doctrine ought to be removed from the sphere of rational belief.
(2) According to Shedd, what are the three main cardinal truths necessary to rationally defend and maintain the doctrine of Hell?
Answer: Shedd favors the defence of three main cardinal truths in order to maintain the doctrine of Hell. These are that there is a just God; that man has free will; and that sin is a voluntary action. If any of these are denied, then only atheism remains a viable doctrine.
(3) How does the theory that punishment is retributive honour human nature?
Answer: The work of punishment is neither chastisement of caliity, but rather it is a retributive work of its own. It’s work is to vindicate law and satisfy justice by looking back at what has been done and requiting man for his misdeeds. Unpunished guilt is the same species of evil as punished innocence. Both the punishment of the guilty and the immunity of the innocent are equally required by justice. In this way, punishment honours human nature – justice is the true ground for penalty and man is treated thus like a person and not merely a chattel. He is handled as a free and voluntary person with the will to turn to evil or away from it. The dignity of man in his free will is thus acknowledged.
(4) How is the endlessness of future punishment implied in the endlessness of guilty and condemnation?
Answer: Shedd points out that the absurdity of asking when a crime is condemned, for how long is it condemned? Damnation means absolute and everlasting damnation. Shedd explains that all suffering in the next life of which the sufficient and justifying reason is guilty, must continue as long as the reason continues, and that reason is everlasting. He argues that if it was righteous today for God to smite the transgressor because he violated the law yesterday, then the state of the case would go on ad infinitum. Yesterday’s guilt is an endless fact. What guilt legitimizes this instance, it legitimizes forever.
(5) How is the bondage of the sinful will related to the endlessness of sin?
Answer: Shedd explains why the bondage of the sinful will is a reason for the endlessness of sin. In the act of transgressing the law, the human will reflexively acts upon itself, making it unable to perfectly keep the law. A man may not be forced to sin, but if he does, he cannot bring himself back to where he was before. Sin ruins all virtuous force in any moral being. One can watch the influence of the sinful will upon himself, the accumulated cost of sinful decisions will continue to eat away and decay all virtue, until that time when he comes before God and his own will has defeated him, leaving only sin and conscience to forever be punished.
(6) How does Shedd explain the statement that “endless punishment is rational because sin is an infinite evil”?
Answer: Sin is infinitely evil because it is committed by a finite being against an infinite being. Shedd points out that we reason that to torture a beast is a crime but to torture a man is a greater crime still. Thus, it is the greatest crime of all to offend an ‘infinite’ being, the greatest of all beings. It thus calls for the endless punishment due by justice to crimes against an infinite being.
(7) How can one argue that the wicked prefer Hell, rather than Heaven?
Answer: The wicked are those who are un-submissive, rebellious, defiant and impenitent. These qualities demonstrate that they are souls that reject God and do not want to be in his presence. Thus, on that view, they must prefer Heaven because they could not stand the sweet submission to God in heaven.
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